

Production Complementarities in Asset Management*

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Abstract

Production complementarities arise in asset management because portfolio managers work in teams, and firms know more about managers' investment skill than investors. Using unique data on compensation in the Israeli mutual fund industry, we find that managers assigned to more skilled teammates and receiving more advertising earn lower compensation today in return for higher expected productivity and future earnings. This tradeoff is stronger for more skilled and less visible managers. Thus, compensation depends not only on manager input but also on complementarities between firm resources and manager skills, suggesting an integral role firms play in ensuring incentive alignment for investors.

Keywords: Mutual Funds; Portfolio Managers; Compensation

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1 Introduction

Asset management has been a key topic in finance because professional investment funds play a major role in the management of global savings and pricing of financial assets. Over the last decades, investors have consistently shown an increasing preference for delegated management leading to rapid industry growth, resulting in \$103 trillion in the assets managed globally by the end of 2020.¹ The central theme in the study of asset management relates fund incentives to generating superior performance. For example, a large literature shows that skilled funds attract more investor inflows and earn higher fee revenues, providing important evidence for incentive alignment between investors and fund families ([Berk and Green \(2004\)](#), [Sirri and Tufano \(1998\)](#)).

However, the actual asset management is conducted by portfolio managers whose incentives are shaped by their contract with the firm rather than directly by investor flows ([Kaniel and Orlov \(2021\)](#)). Even if investors provide implicit flow-based incentives to fund firms, firms need to incorporate these incentives into the actual compensation of fund managers they employ; otherwise, the efficiency of the flow-performance relationship would still be questionable. Despite the obvious importance of the link between compensation and performance, the empirical evidence has been limited and mixed. On the one hand, using the information on portfolio manager compensation structures, [Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#) show that many employment contracts of portfolio managers include bonuses tied closely to performance. On the other hand, using the actual compensation that managers received, [Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman \(2017\)](#) find that a manager's compensation responds weakly to her own performance. The seemingly conflicting evidence highlights the need to study "the complementarities between fund managers and fund complexes" ([Ibert et al. \(2017\)](#)) and inspires us to take a more holistic perspective on managerial incentives. To this end, we explore the role of production complementarities between managers and firms in a joint fund management process and quantify to what extent such complementarities explain variations in manager compensation and its sensitivity to manager performance. Doing so allows us to provide a richer understanding of professionals' actual incentives not only for asset management but also more broadly for labor economics, given the prevalence of joint production in all sorts of economic activities today.² Such understanding is crucial for academics, regulators,

¹The Global Asset Management 2021 Report by Boston Consulting Group.

²Joint production has become prevalent in many economic activities, such as asset management ([Patel and Sarkissian](#)

professionals and investors.

At the center of this paper is the idea that for forward-looking managers, compensation consists not only of today's salary but also the continuation value that she derives from staying with the current firm. The latter is shaped by the within-firm resources that the firm employs to support the manager, making her more productive. In equilibrium, a manager would be willing to accept a lower reward for her skill today in exchange for better firm support that enhances her future productivity. Firms differ in the level of support they can provide and managers differ in how much they benefit from such support, making the compensation contract specific to each manager-firm match. In this setting, the compensation and pay-performance sensitivities can be highly heterogeneous, and a careful evaluation of managerial incentives should account for such complementarities.

The mutual fund industry provides an excellent laboratory for studying the role of production complementarities in incentive provision. First, the industry is highly labor intensive and most learning is undertaken on the job. Nearly 70% of funds are co-managed ([Patel and Sarkissian \(2017b\)](#)). This implies that an individual manager's productivity depends not only on her own human capital but also her team capital – teams that firms assign. Second, the industry is characterized by information asymmetry in that firms have more information than investors about managerial ability ([Berk, Van Binsbergen and Liu \(2017\)](#), [Kaniel and Orlov \(2021\)](#)), and search frictions in that investors have limited resources to conduct fund search ([Hortaçsu and Syverson \(2004\)](#), [Roussanov, Ruan and Wei \(2021\)](#)). This makes advertising and marketing a necessary channel to attract investors and boost fund size ([Solomon, Soltes and Sosyura \(2014\)](#), [Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks \(2015\)](#), [Kaniel and Parham \(2016\)](#)). As a consequence of both features, production complementarities naturally arise in this industry because a firm can influence a manager's expected productivity by teaming her up with the right skillset and advertising her skill to investors. In addition, the mutual fund setting allows us to measure the productivity and skill of individual managers with a reasonable degree of precision. We measure productivity as a manager's total fee revenue which is the market value of a manager's output - the asset management service that ([2017a](#))), academic research ([Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang \(2010\)](#)), department sales ([Chan, Li and Pierce \(2014\)](#)), steel mills ([Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw \(2007\)](#)), sports industry ([Ichniowski and Preston \(2014\)](#)), and garment production ([Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan \(2003\)](#)).

a manager generates.³ We measure skill as the value a manager extracts from capital markets relative to the standard benchmark market returns (Berk and Van Binsbergen (2015)).⁴ Both measures are well-defined and can be readily calculated from the data.

While a large body of economics literature has documented the peer effects on worker productivity, this is the first paper that documents how production complementarities are internalized in compensation.⁵ A major challenge is a lack of readily available and high-quality individual level data on not only productivity but also compensation, and the latter is particularly rare. We overcome this challenge by assembling a large employment compensation dataset from the mutual fund industry in Israel. Spanning across almost the entire population of mutual fund portfolio managers in Israel managing 1,446 mutual funds from 2006 to 2014, our data combine proprietary compensation data from administrative tax records (an analog of the U.S. W-2 form) with publicly available data on their portfolio characteristics (an analog of the CRSP Mutual Fund Database). To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive dataset that includes detailed joint production from which we observe not only who works with whom on which fund, the affiliation of each manager, but also the revenue that each manager generates, the split of revenue between managers and firms, the skill composition within each team, and the sales support provided by each firm.

A preliminary investigation of the data reveals interesting patterns. First, while there is substantial variation in manager compensation and revenue across firms, there is even more variation within firms. Standard manager characteristics and fund attributes, together with firm and manager fixed effects can explain only 68% of the variation in compensation and 73% in revenue. This suggests that when evaluated in isolation, manager and firm characteristics are not sufficient to explain the dispersion in managerial compensation. Second, adding interactions between manager and firm fixed effects boosts the amount of explained variations by an additional 22% for compensation and 21% for revenue, consistent with the presence of production complementari-

³This is consistent with commonly used productivity measures that are based on revenue per employee (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Syverson (2011)).

⁴As a robustness check, we use a manager's alpha as an alternative measure of skill and the results do not change much.

⁵For example, the literature has examined the impact of high-ability agents on their peers' productivity through free riding (Hölmstrom (1979)), learning (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003)), and peer pressure or preferences (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2009, 2010); Mas and Moretti (2009))

ties between managers and the firms in this industry.

We interpret these patterns through the lens of an employment compensation model built upon [Han and Miller \(2015\)](#). The key idea is that an individual's output depends not only on her own characteristics and the affiliated firm's characteristics but also on how well she integrates with the rest of the firm. In the context of the mutual fund industry, team externalities improve managers' investment performance through knowledge spillover; firm advertising contributes to the rate at which managers attract new investment. These two sources of production complementarities reflect a non-wage amenity owing to the preference of managers to work with firms where they are particularly likely to generate more revenues. An immediate implication is that managers assigned to more skilled teams are willing to accept lower compensation today in exchange for higher expected future revenue and compensation. Since team investment skill is complementary to manager own skill, these effects are stronger for more skilled managers. A second implication is that managers who receive larger marketing support from the firm generate higher expected revenue but earn lower compensation today. Because investment skill and advertising are complementary inputs, such effects are stronger for more skilled but less visible managers.

Ultimately, the importance of production complementarities is an empirical question. In our main analysis, we take the model's implications to the data and find strong support for the role of the complementarities in asset management. First, managers assigned to work with skilled teams generate 32% higher expected revenue but earn 10% lower current compensation. These effects are almost twice as large for skilled managers. Second, skilled managers who work for firms with larger sales teams generate 41% higher expected revenue but earn 19% lower current compensation. The effects of advertising are stronger for managers with low own visibility, suggesting that firm advertising is particularly helpful for more competent but less known portfolio managers. These estimates are robust even after we control for a comprehensive set of time-varying manager, firm, fund attributes, as well as rich set of interactions of firm, year, manager and experience fixed effects. Taken together, we find that firm externalities, such as team assignment and firm advertising, affect manager revenue and compensation in opposite directions and that such effects vary across managers depending on the value they drive from firm support. This evidence is hard to reconcile with a static performance-based compensation structure, but it is fully consistent with the incentive provision for forward-looking agents in the presence of production

complementarities.

Two concerns remain even with the very rich set of controls and fixed effects at our disposal. The first concern is the selection of managers into teams or firms based on their time-varying unobserved attributes. For example, more capable managers are more likely to be teamed up with more skilled peers and work for firms with better advertising resources. At the same time, if such capability varies over time in an unobserved way, it is likely to confound the positive team and advertising effects on manager revenue. We note that this is unlikely a concern in our setting. If it was indeed the case, we should observe the firm support variables affect the expected revenue and manager compensation in the same direction. But the estimates show the opposite. Nevertheless, to mitigate this concern, we further restrict the sample to managers who switch firms or teams within a firm. Comparing manager compensation and revenue right before and after she switches firms helps address the possible selection on time-varying unobserved manager characteristics. Performing the same analysis when a manager switches teams within a firm further helps control the unobserved time-varying conditions specific to firm-manager-year level other than changes in team composition. Overall, the results are highly robust across all these specifications, suggesting that sorting on unobservables is unlikely to bias our main findings.

Another legitimate concern is the potential endogeneity associated with firm investment in advertising. To address this, we instrument the size of the sales team in a given firm by the average size of sales teams of other firms in the previous year. The underlying assumption is that a firm increases investment in its sales force in response to an increase in sales investment of its competitors. This is motivated by the evidence from [Roussanov, Ruan and Wei \(2021\)](#) where funds engage in marketing “arms race” since they compete for the same pool of investors. The exclusion restriction is satisfied if the industry-level sales investment, excluding the firm itself, does not directly affect the compensation of the firm’s individual managers, conditional on a rich set of controls. We provide evidence in favor of these assumptions and find that the IV estimates are highly comparable to those from the baseline specifications.

Our study contributes to the literature on compensation and incentives in asset management. A large and increasing body of the literature has focused on the demand side of this industry – how investors compensate asset managers and how they pay for the services of the fund ([Fama and French \(2010\)](#)), [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#) and [Berk and Van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#)). The prior work

emphasized the role of implicit incentives embedded in the convex relationship between fund flows and performance (Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997)).⁶ We contribute to this literature by noting that the actual asset management is conducted by portfolio managers whose incentives are shaped by their compensation contracts with the firm. If firms failed to incorporate proper incentives into compensation, the performance-based incentives on the demand alone would not be sufficient to achieve optimal incentive alignment. We show that firms play an important role in facilitating asset management, passing performance-based incentives from investors to portfolio managers.

Turning to the supply side of the industry, compensation of portfolio managers by firms has received little attention despite its importance for better understanding managerial incentives. A notable exception is the recent theoretical advancement by Kaniel and Orlov (2021) who show skilled managers are willing to accept below-reservation wages today in exchange for building reputation faster. Our focus on the tradeoff managers face between the salary today and the production complementarities that the firm provides is consistent with this idea.⁷ On the empirical front, two pioneering papers on compensation contracts between fund families (firms) and managers are Ma, Tang and Gomez (2019) and Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman (2017).

Using U.S. data on compensation structure from the SEC filings, Ma, Tang and Gomez (2019) find that 79% of funds offer a bonus contingent on performance, hence providing strong evidence for the prevalence of performance-based incentives in the mutual fund industry. Our work shares a similar spirit in that both are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium in the mutual fund industry (Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2008)). We enrich the understanding of the managerial incentives by showing that incentives depend not only on monetary compensation but also on idiosyncratic matches between managers and firms. The latter helps explain how and why the relationship between manager performance and compensation varies across firms and managers.

Using the actual compensation data from the Swedish mutual fund industry, Ibert, Kaniel,

⁶The explicit performance-based incentives rarely exist in advisory contracts between mutual fund companies and their investors (Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003)).

⁷Dicks and Fulghieri (2021) provide a theory for why fund managers may be compensated on the basis of aggregate measures of performance in the firm rather than manager-specific performance. Empirically, we control for firm-level performance by including firm \times year fixed effects. Conceptually, their holistic perspective on managerial incentives is consistent with ours.

Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman (2017) do not find strong evidence for sensitivity of pay to performance. Instead, they emphasize the role of the firm, showing that firm-level revenue, profits and performance are important determinants of manager compensation. Inspired by this, we take an approach that examines manager input and firm input jointly rather than separately. Doing so allows us to rationalize the seemingly conflicting evidence about sensitivity of pay to performance. In particular, in a world where managers and the firm work together to produce, the pay-performance sensitivity would be mitigated by the firm-level input if such input contributes positively to a manager's productivity. We test this explanation by incorporating two firm inputs – team assignment and firm advertising, both of which complement an individual manager's skill in the joint production. The results reveal that small average pay-performance sensitivities mask substantial heterogeneity in compensation incentives, depending on how much managers benefit from complementary team skills and sales investment that firms provide. In this sense, our findings add a new layer to the understanding of the managerial incentives, revealing a rich picture of the interplay between the firms and the managers they employ.

More broadly, our work adds to the labor economics literature on within-firm network capital such as the peer effects on productivity through cooperation or helping (Kandel and Lazear (1992)). We confirm the importance of worker coordination design in labor markets (Holmström and Milgrom (1990)). One important missing piece in the literature is the within-firm network effects on labor compensation. While Han and Miller (2015) develop and test the employment network theory on compensation and turnover in the context of the real estate brokerage industry, they investigate a different source of production complementarity. In addition, they do not observe the actual compensation and rely on a structural model to infer its distribution. Our advantage is that we precisely observe how firms compensate each individual manager. This allows us to provide direct evidence about how an employee is integrated into the rest of the firm and how this employee-firm-specific integration is internalized in her lifetime compensation. The new evidence that we gain in the mutual fund industry shows that the firm has an advantage in matching multiple distinct types of labor, contributing to the literature on the role of firms in a broad set of industries.

2 Institutional Background and Dataset

In this section, we describe the construction of the dataset. We also discuss the summary statistics and the definitions of the key variables.

2.1 The Israeli Mutual Fund Market

In 2014, the Israeli mutual market included roughly 1,446 funds that managed \$80B. The market consists of different types of funds starting from pure equity funds and ending with government bond funds. Many funds are hybrid and invest into a number of different asset classes simultaneously. As a group, Israeli mutual funds allocate roughly 25% of assets to equities, 30% to corporate bonds and another 25% to government bonds. In Appendix, Table B1 shows the distribution of funds across asset classes.

2.2 Dataset Construction

We construct our dataset from several data sources. We start with public disclosures of mutual fund companies (Part B of Fund Prospectus) to identify individual mutual fund portfolio managers. Since 2010, mutual fund companies in Israel have to disclose the identity of their portfolio managers through public reports submitted to the Israel Securities Authority and the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange on an annual basis.⁸ We hand-collect the information on portfolio managers including age, job tenure, the list of funds they manage every year as well as the date when they started to manage a particular fund.⁹ This data allows us to track almost the entire population of mutual fund portfolio managers in Israel from 2010 to 2014.¹⁰ As we observe the dates when managers became responsible for particular funds, we extend the dataset back to 2006 for a subset of managers and funds. For example, if we know that the manager started managing the fund in February 2006, we include this fund in her portfolio since the given date.

⁸This information is publicly available both on <http://maya.tase.co.il> and on <https://www.magna.isa.gov.il>.

⁹The firms are not obliged to disclose the names of fund managers but they have to disclose their license numbers. All portfolio managers in Israel have to pass the Israel Securities Authority qualification exam to obtain a license to be able to work as portfolio managers. In cases when we had only a license number, we used it to find the individual manager's name on the Israel Securities Authority website.

¹⁰Very small mutual fund companies are not subject to this disclosure, so the data set does not cover the whole population of fund managers.

Next we match this data using unique fund identifiers with a database on monthly characteristics of funds purchased from Praedicta - a large private Israeli data vendor.¹¹ This survivorship bias-free database covers the entire universe of Israeli mutual funds; it includes detailed fund characteristics such as fees, assets under management, returns, fund style and asset allocation across broadly defined sets of securities. The overall matched sample covers 87% of the Israeli mutual fund industry's assets under management between 2010 and 2014 and 49% of this industry between 2006 and 2009 (see Figure B1 in the Appendix). We exclude index funds and money market funds from this sample.

We then construct portfolios of funds for each manager on an annual basis to later fit the compensation data which is reported annually. Fund managers can be listed as managers of multiple funds, and funds can have multiple managers. If the fund is managed by N managers, we follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman (2017), attributing $1/N$ assets to every manager assuming that all the managers listed contribute equally to the management of the fund. We construct annualized manager portfolio's characteristics such as fees and fund age as an AUM-weighted sum of characteristics of individual funds.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A shows the manager-level data where the unit of observation is manager-year. The average manager is 39 years old, manages the average fund in her portfolio for 2.5 years, has 6.1 years of experience in mutual fund management and 8.5 years of experience in the asset management industry. In terms of education, 49% of managers hold an MBA degree, and 56% of them have a master's degree in another area. 23% of portfolio managers manage predominantly equity funds, 18% of them own their asset management firms and 12% have additional responsibilities beyond portfolio management such as, for example, being a CEO, Head of Investment Committee or Chief Strategist. The average portfolio manager is responsible for managing 4.6 funds.

Panel B presents characteristics of individual funds which we use to obtain manager-level portfolio characteristics. The average fund has 110 million shekels under management, has been operating for 8 years, and charges percentage fee of 0.95%. The average fund's risk-adjusted performance equals -1%, but it is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Panel C presents the data at the firm level. The average firm employs 2.8 managers and oper-

¹¹This data set has been previously used in Shaton (2017) and Sokolinski (2022).

ates 24 mutual funds. These characteristics vary significantly across firms.

2.3 Compensation and Productivity

The key outcome variables in our analysis are compensation and productivity. We measure a manager's compensation in two ways, by the amount that she receives in a given year and by a split ratio measured by the fraction of the compensation the manager receives out of the total revenue that her funds generate. The latter is consistent with the notion that fund managers capture only a share of the additional fund revenues (Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman (2017)), which is agreed upon between the firm and the manager. To start, we match portfolios of individual managers with their compensation data using administrative tax records from the Israel Tax Authority. We use Form 106 (the equivalent of the U.S. W-2), an annual statement of wage and taxes. We directly observe the annual compensation from each employer and can exactly infer how much each manager earned from a particular asset management firm. We exclude a small number of cases where managers worked less than nine months in the company. The final dataset includes 255 managers and 1,264 manager-year observations.

As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the average mutual fund portfolio manager in Israel earns 426,000 shekels per year which equals approximately \$121,000 during that time period. This statistic puts the average manager in the top 2% of labor income distribution in Israel. At the same time, there is significant variation in compensation in our sample, with the 10th percentile being equal to 97,000 shekels and the 90th percentile being equal to 742,000 shekels. The average split ratio equals 12.13%, with the 10th percentile being equal to 2.31% and the 90th percentile being equal to 42.40%. Overall, the patterns here are consistent with the recent evidence that compensation in the finance industry is higher and more skewed than in other sectors (Célérier and Vallée (2019)).

Turning to productivity, we consider total fee revenue generated by a manager's portfolio funds as a proxy. Fee revenue measures the total market value of the asset management services provided by the manager. In this sense, it fits well with the recent literature that measures productivity with revenue per employee (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Syverson (2011)). Manager productivity in the form of fee revenue captures the value of the total output, as opposed to manager skill (which we discuss below) that measures the quality of one particular input. We define the manager's fee revenue as:

$$Revenue_{mt} = \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt}} \left(\frac{AUM_{it}}{N_{it}} \times f_{it} \right), \quad (1)$$

where Ω_{mt} is the set of all the funds managed by manager m in year t , AUM_{it} are assets under management in fund i , f_{it} is a fund i 's fee (expense ratio), and N_{it} is the number of managers who manage fund i . We attribute equal $(1/N_{it})$ fraction of revenue to each manager m as in [Chevalier and Ellison \(1999\)](#), [Berk, Van Binsbergen and Liu \(2017\)](#) and [Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman \(2017\)](#). Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average manager generates 4.8 million shekels in fee revenue. There is substantial dispersion in manager productivity since the 10th percentile equals 0.1 million shekels, and the 90th percentile equals nearly 12 million shekels.

The distribution of both revenue and compensation is highly uneven. The top panel of Figure 1 plots the fractions of revenue and compensation earned by managers across deciles of revenue and compensation distributions. The managers at the top two deciles together generate 65% of fees and earn 57% of compensation. The bottom panel plots the average split ratio across split ratio deciles. The managers with split ratios at the top decile collect on average 61% of fee revenues in the form of compensation, while the managers at the bottom decile collect 1.7%.

An attractive feature of our dataset is that it provides within-firm and between-firm variation in compensation and productivity. In Figure 2, we decompose the manager-year-level variations into within-firm and between-firm variations by regressing compensation and revenue against a set of manager and firm characteristics, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. For an intuitive comparison, we center the distribution of between-firm fixed effects and within-firm residuals on the mean compensation and revenue in the data. Figure 2 shows significant variation both within and between firms. Even after accounting for manager and portfolio characteristics, the between-firm standard deviation of $\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})$ equals 0.73, while the within-firm standard deviation is larger, being equal to 0.88. Revenues and split ratios exhibit similar patterns. A growing literature relates the distribution of pay in finance to heterogeneous levels of manager performance ([Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#)) and firm revenues and profits ([Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman \(2017\)](#)). We explore the role of production complementarities between managers and firms that create variations within and between firms.

2.4 Sources of Production Complementarities

We distinguish between two sources of production complementarities in the mutual fund industry: teamwork and advertising. First, the financial industry is highly labor intensive, and teamwork has been particularly prevalent (Patel and Sarkissian (2017a), Patel and Sarkissian (2017b)). This implies that an individual manager's productivity depends not only on her human capital but also her team's capital – teams that are often assigned by firms. Second, the industry is characterized by information asymmetry in that firms have more information than investors about managerial ability (Berk, Van Binsbergen and Liu (2017)). Hence through advertising, firms can significantly boost fund size (Solomon, Soltes and Sosyura (2014), Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks (2015), Kaniel and Parham (2016), Roussanov, Ruan and Wei (2021)). Since managers differ in their skills and visibility, the benefits they derive from the same level of team and advertising support may vary. To capture these idiosyncratic match values, we construct measures of manager skill, team skill, manager visibility and firm advertising support in turn. The variations in these measures provide the key sources of production complementarities that we explore in this paper.

Manager Skill and Team Skill We follow Berk and Van Binsbergen (2015) and construct a measure of manager skill based on the value that the manager extracts from capital markets. Since manager alpha represents returns to investors and depends on fund size, the fund i 's value added over year t is defined as:

$$V_{it} = AUM_{i,t-1}\alpha_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where $AUM_{i,t-1}$ are assets under management in fund i at the end of year $t - 1$ and the fund's annual alpha is calculated as the difference between the fund's annual return R_{it} and its benchmark return R_{it}^B :

$$\alpha_{it} = R_{it} - R_{it}^B. \quad (3)$$

We estimate the benchmark return R_{it}^B using a procedure similar to the one from Berk and Van Binsbergen (2015) (see Appendix A for details).

We define manager m 's value added as a total value added of all the funds under her manage-

ment. If fund i is managed by N_{it} managers in year t , we attribute equal $(1/N_{it})$ fraction of value added to each manager. Then manager m 's value added is defined:

$$V_{mt} = \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt}} \frac{V_{it}}{N_{it}}, \quad (4)$$

where Ω_{mt} is the set of all the funds managed by manager m in year t . We next define manager m 's skill as an expected value added given manager history up to year t :

$$S_{mt} = \sum_{w=1}^{T_{mt}} \frac{V_{mw}}{T_{mt}}, \quad (5)$$

where T_{mt} is the number of years manager m appears in the data prior to year t .¹² For easier interpretation of our regression results, we create an indicator variable $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$ which equals one if $S_{mt} > 0$. In other words, we call a portfolio manager "skilled" if she is expected to extract positive value from capital markets given her history, as opposed to destroying value.

We define $1_{Team_{mt}}$ as an indicator variable that equals one if at least one of the funds in the manager's portfolio is co-managed. If manager i works on team in year t , we measure the manager team's skill by calculating the average skill of her co-workers given by:

$$S_{mt}^{team} = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{n \neq m} S_{nt}, \quad (6)$$

where N is a number of team members, and S_{nt} is a skill of manager n in year t . If a manager works on multiple teams, we calculate S_{mt}^{team} across all the co-workers in all the teams. We also map S_{mt}^{team} variable into the indicator variable $1_{Skilled\ Team_{mt}}$ which equals one if $S_{mt}^{team} > 0$.

Panel A of Table 1 shows that the fraction of managers on teams over the sample years equals 75% which is comparable to the U.S. estimates from [Patel and Sarkissian \(2017b\)](#). Excluding the manager herself, an average manager is on 1.55 teams and has 0.7 teammates. In addition, about 37% of portfolio managers work with skilled teams. Figure 3 shows that the fraction of managers working on teams increased from less than 60% to around 80% between 2006 and 2014. The

¹²[Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#) show that the average performance evaluation period is three years, based on the data from the U.S. compensation contracts. While we follow [Berk and Van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#) and take into account the entire history of the manager prior to year t , the average T_{mt} equals 3.5 years which is close to the estimate from [Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#).

fraction of co-managed funds increased from less than 40% to around 60%. The prevalence of teamwork highlights the increasing importance of peer effects in the mutual fund industry.

Manager Visibility and Sales Team Size We next construct a measure of manager m 's own visibility in time t , $Visibility_{mt}$, based on the total number of media mentions in the popular financial media. We go through the websites of the three major Israeli financial newspapers and one popular financial website.¹³ We perform searches of each manager's name and count the number of articles that mention the manager in each year across all the websites from 2006 to 2014. We read all the articles to verify that the name mentioned in the article belongs to the portfolio manager. Most of the articles left describe managers' performance, their opinions on financial markets, securities recommendations, and their career moves.

As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the visibility of the average manager equals 8, meaning that 8 articles mentioning the average manager were published in the major financial media outlets in a given year. Nearly 25% of portfolio managers have zero visibility. Roussanov, Ruan and Wei (2021) show that marketing is nearly as important as performance and fees for determining fund size in the mutual fund industry. The substantial variation in visibility across portfolio managers thus highlights another important source of production externality that firms provide: marketing and advertising.¹⁴

We measure the firm's ability to market and advertise its funds by evaluating how much labor is allocated to sales, marketing and advertising. We call this measure the relative sales team size. To calculate it, we go through Part B of the Prospectus where each mutual fund company provides a disclosure about the firm's structure and the number of employees in different departments. We define the relative sales team size as:

$$Sales\ Team_{ft} = \frac{Salespeople_{ft}}{K_{ft}} \quad (7)$$

where $Salespeople_{ft}$ is the number of employees who are involved in sales, marketing, business development or financial adviser relations in firm f in year t , and K_{ft} is a total number of funds

¹³The four sources are The Marker, Globes, Calcalist and Bizportal.

¹⁴Advertising plays an important role in Israel for several reasons described in Sokolinski (2022). In particular, the Israeli mutual fund market is dominated by retail investors who buy fund shares via bank-employed financial advisers. However, the compensation of advisers is regulated by the government which sets fixed commissions across asset classes. As a result, the mutual fund families cannot boost sales by differentially compensating financial advisers; they have to rely on other marketing channels such as direct media-based advertising.

in firm f in year t .

Using $Salespeople_{ft}$ limits our sample in a number of ways. First, some firms do not report the number of salespeople. Second, these disclosures are available only after 2010 so we can use this measure only for a subsample of managers. Overall, we can collect and match sales team data with 943 manager-year observations, representing 74% of our sample. Panel C of Table 1 shows that the mean sales team size is 0.42, indicating that an average fund receives 0.42 staff support in marketing and advertising. There is a substantial dispersion in sales team size across firms, with the 90th percentile nearly four times than the 10th percentile.

The prior work evaluates marketing efforts at the fund-level. It is done by examining the distribution commissions (for example, 12b-1 fees in the U.S.) charged by the firms (Roussanov, Ruan and Wei (2021)) or by directly observing the media coverage, for example, in newspapers (Solomon et al. (2014), Kaniel and Parham (2016)). Since commissions represent the compensation to brokers for fund distribution, they are a good measure of marketing resources devoted to this specific sales channel in markets where this channel plays an important role. Media coverage of individual funds and their holdings represent the amount of the advertising output. It is less informative about the amount of inputs allocated to marketing, especially at the firm level. Unlike these measures, our measure focuses on the relative amount of labor inputs allocated to sales and marketing at the firm-level. This allows us to take into account a variety of potential sales activities such as advertising across multiple media sources. Our measure thus represents a proxy for the aggregate amount of “marketing support” that the firm is able to provide to its portfolio managers.

In our empirical work below, we map $Sales Team_{ft}$ and $Visibility_{mt}$ into two indicator variables: $1_{Large Sales Team_{ft}}$ and $1_{High Visibility_{mt}}$. Both indicator variables equal one if the value of the underlying continuous variable is above its median in year t .

2.5 Baseline Differences in Compensation and Productivity

Table 2 reports the differences in manager compensation and productivity. In Panel A, we sort managers on their own skill and on the skill of their team. Managers who work with skilled teams generate higher revenue but earn lower compensation. This result holds for both skilled and less skilled managers but the effects are stronger for skilled managers. In particular, skilled managers

working with skilled teams generate 4.34M shekels higher revenue but earn 90K lower salary, relative to skilled managers working with less skilled teams. Less skilled managers working with skilled teams generate 3.14M higher revenue but earn 50K less than their counterparts working with less skilled teams. As a result, being on the skilled team for skilled managers is associated with 40K lower compensation and 1.21M higher revenue, relative to less skilled managers.

Panel B of Table 2 illustrates similar patterns across managers who work for firms with large and small sales teams. Those who work for firms with large sales teams generate higher revenue, earn lower compensation, and the effects are stronger for skilled managers. Specifically, skilled managers working for firms with large sales teams earn 60K lower compensation and generate 1.43M higher revenue in comparison with less skilled managers.

Since team skill and firm marketing efforts help boost fund size, the positive association between team skill, firm advertising and the corresponding manager's revenue is expected. However, these variables are negatively associated with the current monetary compensation that the manager receives. This is hard to reconcile with standard incentive-based theories where the observed revenue or observed revenue-enhancing factors are used as contractable measures to form a basis for compensation contracts. In the subsequent theoretical framework, we interpret these patterns through the lens of a joint production model.

3 Conceptual Framework

In this section we present a simple framework to illustrate the nature of a compensation equilibrium in the presence of production complementarities.

Labor Market Setup. The framework is adapted from [Han and Miller \(2015\)](#)'s model of dynamic interactions within an employment network which includes a much more detailed setting.¹⁵ We present the model and its equilibrium implications in a heuristic way, since our paper is empirical in its focus.

The key idea is that the value added by each agent to a project depends not only on the agent's characteristics but also on how well the agent integrates with the rest of the firm. Positive ex-

¹⁵Their model endogenizes entry and exit of the individual agent from the network, the creation and dissolution of firms, and choice of compensation form, which we abstract from given our focus on production complementarities.

ternalities within the firm increase human capital by facilitating future production. The revenue from each project is divided between agent salary and firm profits. Firms set compensation packages for their agents and are responsible for hiring. The equilibrium outcomes are defined by the compensation of agents, the profits of firms, and the entry, mobility and retirement choices of the agents.

Consider an agent i who works on her s th project for firm j . The agent's characteristics are denoted by a vector x_{is} . The characteristics of the firm are denoted by a vector y_{ijs} . Both vectors are dynamically updated when i completes a project or when she moves across firms. The agent's characteristics follow the deterministic law of motion $x_{i,s+1} \equiv g(x_{is}, y_{ijs})$. We denote the production output of the s th project (i.e. revenue) as $m_{is}(x_{is})$. Revenue increases with x_{is} ($\frac{\partial m_{is}}{\partial x_{is}} > 0$), in line with the idea that agents with better characteristics (for example, more skilled or visible) generate more revenue.¹⁶

It is convenient to cast the j th firm's offer to agent i as an expected lifetime compensation package – the sum of the current salary $b_j(m_{is})$ plus the agent's future expected compensation from being with the firm j at least until the next project is completed, $f_j(m_{i,s+1})$. Specifically, $b_j(m_{is}) = \alpha_{js} + \beta_{ijs}m_{ijs}(x_{is})$ where α_{js} captures a firm-wide bonus and $\beta_{ijs}m_{ijs}(x_{is})$ captures a bonus component that is contingent on the agent's production output.¹⁷ Similarly, $f_j(m_{i,s+1}) = E_s [\alpha_{j,s+1} + \beta_{ij,s+1}m_{ijs}(x_{is})]$. In equilibrium, the firm chooses the optimal split ratio, β_{ijs} , such that a manager is indifferent between staying with the current firm and receiving u_{is} from an outside option netting of switching cost ϵ_{is} . Following [Han and Miller \(2015\)](#), the alternative payoff u_{is} falls into one of the two situations. If the agent receives an alternative employment opportunity from another firm $k \neq j$, then neither firm j nor k has an incentive to deviate from the dominant strategy of bidding up to the net value of the agent added to the firm. Both firms bid up to the break even point, implying that firm j would be willing to pay to a comprehensive package of $u_{is} = b_k(m_{is}) + f_k(m_{i,s+1}|y_k)$ net of switching cost. When the agent does not have another alterna-

¹⁶As noted earlier in the paper, there is a large literature that supports positive relationships between revenue and manager skill and visibility. Given our focus on the supply side relationship between fund firms and the managers they employ, we take the demand side relationship $\frac{\partial m_{is}}{\partial x_{is}} > 0$ as given. Incorporating the role of investors and frictions from the demand side would add considerably to the analytical complexity of the model without changing the model's key implications for manager compensation.

¹⁷In the case of the mutual fund industry, [Ma et al. \(2019\)](#) document that 79% of funds have compensation contracts with a bonus component.

tive firm to consider, her outside option is quitting the profession. In this case, u_{is} simply denotes the payoff from quitting. Thus the equilibrium compensation for managers (α, β) is determined by

$$b_j(m_{is}) + f_j(m_{i,s+1}) \equiv [\alpha_{js} + \beta_{ijs}m_{ijs}(x_{is})] + E_s [\alpha_{j,s+1} + \beta_{ij,s+1}m_{ij,s+1}(x_{i,s+1})] = u_{is} - \epsilon_{is}. \quad (8)$$

Production Complementarities. We apply this model to the mutual fund industry. We measure x_{is} by a manager's skill and visibility and measure y_{ijs} by the average skill in the team (excluding the manager herself) and the size of the sales team, both of which are assigned by the firm j at the s th project. The production complementarity takes the following form:

Assumption 1: $\frac{\partial x_{i,s+1}}{\partial y_{ijs}} > 0$

Assumption 1 states that y_{ijs} facilitates the growth of agent i 's human capital. In the context of the mutual fund industry, we conjecture that a manager gains more skill by working with skilled teams and more visibility when receiving larger marketing support. This assumption captures two distinct institutional features of the industry. First, most of the learning is undertaken on the job and fund management by teams of portfolio managers has become prevalent ([Patel and Sarkissian \(2017b\)](#)). Thus a manager can gain more skill by working with a highly skilled team through knowledge spillover and accumulated experience.¹⁸ Second, the industry is also featured by asymmetric information in that firms know more about managers' skill than investors ([Berk, Van Binsbergen and Liu \(2017\)](#)). As a result, a firm's marketing investment is not only important but also necessary for improving a manager's visibility among investors, particularly for those highly-performing but less visible managers.

Table [B2](#) presents the evidence for Assumption 1. It reports the relationship between the firm support that a manager currently receives and her future skill and visibility, controlling for the agent's current skill, visibility and other characteristics, as well as firm-year and manager fixed effects.¹⁹ Columns (1) and (2) show strong positive correlation between the manager's current and future skill levels, consistent with the skill persistence documented in [Berk and Van Binsbergen](#)

¹⁸In our framework, teamwork directly increases the future skill of individual managers which can result in the improved future skill of the entire team. We note that teamwork can also improve team skills through other channels such as diversity ([Evans, Prado, Rizzo and Zambrana \(2021\)](#)) or by reducing excessive trading ([Fedyk, Patel and Sarkissian \(2020\)](#)).

¹⁹We discuss our choice of empirical specifications in detail in [Section 4](#).

(2015). More importantly, we find that working with a skilled team significantly increases the manager's skill in the future, in line with the common wisdom that agents improve their skill by learning-and-working with higher-ability peers.²⁰ In a similar spirit, columns (3) and (4) show that managers supported by a larger sales team are likely to be more visible in the future. This result echos the recent literature on the importance of marketing and advertising in the mutual fund industry (Kaniel and Orlov (2021) and Roussanov et al. (2021)).

Proposition 1 *Under Assumption 1, a higher level of firm j 's support matched to agent i , y_{ijs} , leads to*
a. an increase in future productivity of the agent ($E_s [m_{i,s+1}]$), and
b. a reduction in current compensation (b_{ijs}) and split ratio (β_{ijs}).²¹

Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium, an agent is willing to trade current salary ($b_j(m_{is})$) for receiving positive within-firm externalities (y_{ijs}), as the latter enhances her future profile and hence expected lifetime earnings.

Assumption 2: $\frac{\partial x_{i,s+1}}{\partial y_{ijs} \partial \text{Skill}_{i,s}} > 0$

Assumption 2 states that more skilled managers benefit more from firm support, in line with the evidence from Table B2. In particular, more skilled managers improve their future skill more if they work with skilled teams; similarly, they also gain more visibility in the future if they receive larger marketing support. Together, these findings indicate the presence of positive team skill complementarities and skill-advertising complementarities in the mutual fund industry. Intuitively, managers differ in their skill and visibility, and firms differ in their team allocation and sales support. These differences create variations in how much managers benefit from firm support and hence in how much they are willing to give up in current compensation in exchange for support.

Proposition 2. *Under Assumptions 1 and 2, $\frac{\partial b_{ijs}}{\partial \text{Skill}_{i,s}}$ decreases with firm support y_{ijs} .²²*

Proposition 2 implies that, while the wage premium to skill (i.e. sensitivity of pay to skill) is always positive, the level of skill premium decreases with the firm-level input if more skilled

²⁰Literature has extensively documented the impact of high-ability agents on their peers' productivity through free riding (Hölmstrom (1979)), learning (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003)), and peer pressure or preferences (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2009, 2010); Mas and Moretti (2009)) and shared network and reputation.

²¹Proof of Proposition 1: Following Assumption 1, higher y_{ijs} leads to higher $x_{i,s+1}$, which further increases $E_s [m_{i,s+1}]$ given $\frac{\partial m_{i,s}}{\partial x_{i,s}} > 0$. Given that the right-hand-side of equation (8) is independent of y_{ijs} , this further leads to a decline in current compensation b_{ijs} and split ratio (β_{ijs}).

²²Proof of Proposition 2: This follows directly from Assumption 2 and the equilibrium condition (8).

managers benefit more from such input. Intuitively, forward-looking managers would be willing to accept a lower reward for her skill today in order to be matched with more skillful peers and better marketing support.

Together, Propositions 1 and 2 offer an equilibrium link between a manager's compensation and firm support. In the absence of complementarities, the marginal productivity and future characteristics of agent i are independent of the support she receives from the firm ($\frac{\partial x_{i,s+1}}{\partial y_{ij,s}} = 0$). As a result, the marginal effects of $x_{i,s}$ on manager i 's productivity (m_i) and salary (b_i) are fixed, and the sensitivity of pay to skill ($\frac{\partial b_{ij,s}}{\partial \text{skill}_{i,s}}$) does not vary across managers or firms. In this sense, our model nests the standard performance-based pay model as a special case. On the other hand, if a firm can use its capital to facilitate the growth of the manager's human capital ($\frac{\partial x_{i,s+1}}{\partial y_{ij,s}} > 0$) with disproportionately higher impact on skilled managers ($\frac{\partial x_{i,s+1}}{\partial y_{ij,s} \partial \text{skill}_{i,s}} > 0$), then better matched firm capital raises the expected productivity of manager i and reduces her current salary in equilibrium. With heterogeneous managers and firms, the degree of production complementary varies across firms and agents, making the compensation contract and its pay-to-skill sensitivity specific for each manager-firm match. Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 generate testable implications for our empirical analysis.

Implication 1. *Else equal, an increase in the team skill leads to an increase in manager i 's expected productivity and a reduction in the current salary. These effects are stronger for more skilled managers.*

Implication 2. *Else equal, an increase in the size of the sales team leads to an increase in manager i 's expected productivity and a reduction in the current salary. These effects are stronger for more skilled but less visible managers.*

To summarize, the key crux of the model is that the compensation consists not only of today's salary but also the continuation value. The latter is shaped by the within-firm resources that firms employ to support their managers. In the mutual fund industry, peer externalities improve managers' investment performance through knowledge spillover; firm advertising contributes to the rate at which managers attract new investment. These two sources of production complementarities reflect a non-wage amenity owing to the preference of managers to work with firms that they are particularly likely to generate more revenues and higher lifetime compensation. While the within-firm labor composition and marketing resources can be fixed for each firm, their benefits vary across managers, placing firms on uneven footing with respect to the salary they offer to dif-

ferent managers. Ultimately, the existence and magnitude of these compensation externalities are an empirical question. In the next section, we take the model’s implications to the data.

4 Empirical Analysis

In this section, we first examine the general importance of production complementarities for explaining variations in manager pay and revenue. We then estimate the effects of two sources of production complementarities assigned by the firm: team capital and marketing support.

4.1 Variation in Compensation and Revenue

We start with the following econometric specification:

$$y_{mft} = \lambda_f + \lambda_t + \gamma X_{mft} + \epsilon_{mft}, \quad (9)$$

where y_{mft} takes one of the two outcome variables (compensation and expected revenue) for manager m of firm f in year t , and λ_f and λ_t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. X_{mft} is a set of time-varying manager and portfolio characteristics such as: the manager’s skill ($1_{Skilled_{mt}}$), the age of the portfolio funds, the number of funds under management, the manager’s fund and industry experience, her age and education, the indicator variable for being predominantly an equity manager ($1_{Equity_{mt}}$), as well as indicator variables for being an owner or having additional responsibilities outside of portfolio management.²³ In all the specifications, the standard errors are double-clustered by manager and year. We exploit the role of time-invariant production complementarities on compensation and revenue by examining the changes in R-squared with and without the interactions between manager and firm fixed effects. Thus, although all models include the time-varying characteristics of managers and firms as well as various fixed effects, we do not include interactions between manager characteristics and firm characteristics in the baseline specification.

We present the results in Table 3. For brevity, we only report the R-squared, and the full set

²³Since financial adviser compensation in Israel is fixed within asset classes (Sokolinski (2022)), controlling for equity exposure also helps account for the effects of financial advice on fund size. This ensures that our results are not driven by the differences in adviser compensation across funds.

of results appears in Tables B3 - B5 in the Appendix. To start, column (1) confirms common findings from the previous literature. In particular, observed manager characteristics such as manager experience, visibility and investment skill, together with observed portfolio characteristics such as fund age and size, explain 25% of the variation in compensation and 38% of the variation in revenue. In column (2), adding firm fixed effects raises the R-squared to 47% for compensation and 57% for revenue. In column (3), we add interaction between firm and year fixed effects which results in R-squared of 58% for compensation and 66% for revenue. This captures all time-varying firm-level characteristics such as advertising, marketing, research and distribution network, which plays an important role in a manager's output and compensation (Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman (2017)). In column (4), adding manager fixed effects allows us to further control for unobserved time-invariant manager characteristics that are related to investment skills or reputation. Doing so delivers additional explanatory power, yet a large fraction of variation compensation and revenues still remains unexplained, leaving room for other determinants.

In column (5), we add the interaction between manager and firm fixed effects, which captures the unobserved time-invariant complementarities specific to the particular firm-manager match. The R-squared increases to 80% for compensation and 90% for revenue, consistent with our framework where the productivity of a manager depends not only on her own skills and the level of firm support but also on how well she integrates with the rest of the firm. The latter creates an idiosyncratic match between managers and firms, which adds substantial explanatory power for manager output and compensation. In column (6), we further look into the role of matching at a more granular level and include an interaction between manager and team fixed effects to capture unobserved complementarities between portfolio managers and specific portfolio management teams within firms. The R-squared further increases to 90% for compensation and 94% for revenues, indicating that the production complementarity at the team level matters even more than that at the firm level.

The significant increase in R-squared with the inclusion of the interaction of fixed effects reveals two key facts. First, a substantial dispersion in portfolio manager compensation cannot be fully explained by portfolio and manager characteristics or by systematic differences across managers and firms. Second, matching between managers and firms, especially between managers and teams within the firm, explains a significant part of the variation in both compensation and

revenue. The evidence points to the existence of production complementarities modeled in Section 3. In the next section, we distinguish between two sources of production complementarities and estimate their effects on revenue and compensation.

4.2 Estimation Strategy

To start, we extend the baseline specification in the following way:

$$y_{mft} = \lambda_f + \lambda_t + \beta C_{mft} + \gamma X_{mft} + \epsilon_{mft}, \quad (10)$$

where

$$C_{mft} = \left[1_{Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Skilled Team_{mft}} \right].$$

C_{mft} includes the main set of variables that capture the team effects. We start with the teamwork variables, $1_{Team_{mft}}$ and $1_{Skilled Team_{mft}}$, to separately evaluate the team effect both along the extensive margin (being on a team) and along the intensive margin (being on a highly skilled team). In line with Implication 1, we further include their interactions with $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$ to examine how the team effects vary across managers with different skill levels.

The main identifying assumption behind the specification in Equation 10 is that the variables in C_{mft} are uncorrelated with unobserved time-varying factors ϵ_{mft} , conditional on the set of control variables X_{mft} , and fixed effects λ_f and λ_t . However, this assumption is subject to a number of selection concerns. First, more capable managers are more likely to work in teams with other capable managers. Controlling for manager skill helps alleviate this problem, but manager ability and potential are ultimately unobserved and can be correlated with both team-related variables and outcome variables. Second, the decisions regarding team composition and hiring can be affected by unobserved time-varying policies at the firm-level. The same unobserved time-varying firm effects can influence compensation and revenues of individual portfolio managers, being a confounding factor for the production complementarity effects.

We take several steps to address these concerns. First, we estimate specifications of the form:

$$y_{mft} = \lambda_f \times \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \beta C_{mft} + \gamma X_{mft} + \epsilon_{mft}, \quad (11)$$

where we augment our baseline specification with two additional sets of control variables: 1) manager fixed effects, λ_m ; and 2) the interaction between firm and time fixed effects, $\lambda_f \times \lambda_t$. Introducing manager fixed effects allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across managers including manager background and ability. Incorporating the interaction between firm and time fixed effects fully controls for any time-varying firm-specific unobservables such as compensation policy or any policies related to teamwork.²⁴ In these specifications, the effects of team variables are identified from time-series variation for a given manager controlling for time-varying observed and unobserved firm characteristics, time-varying observed manager characteristics and time-invariant unobserved manager characteristics.

Second, we introduce additional interactions between manager fixed effects and an indicator variable $1_{\text{Experienced}_{mft}}$ which equals one if the manager m 's mutual fund industry experience is above the median in year t . This specification allows us to further control for a more obscured source of selection bias: while junior managers are more likely to join a team as a learner, senior managers are more likely to lead a team or work independently. In this specification, the team effects are identified from time-series variation for a given manager *within a specific career stage*. This approach further helps alleviate the concern about selection on the manager's career-stage-specific characteristics.

Despite our inclusion of a comprehensive set of observed characteristics and rich interactions of fixed effects, one may still be concerned about the sorting of managers to teams due to unobserved time-varying factors across managers and firms. To address this, we further restrict the sample to managers who switch firms or teams within a firm. Comparing the same manager's compensation and revenue right before and after she switches firms helps address the possible selection on time-varying unobserved manager characteristics. Performing the same analysis when the manager switches teams within a firm further helps control for the unobserved time-varying conditions that are specific to firm-manager-year level other than changes in team composition. We discuss this approach in detail in Section 5.1.

Turning to the effects of sales and advertising, we augment C_{mft} with additional interaction variables. In particular, we are interested in the effect of sales team size, as measured by the indi-

²⁴The interaction between firm and year fixed effect also captures the differences in performance evaluation periods across firms even if these differences are time-varying.

cator variable $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$, and how it varies across managers with different skill and visibility, as measured by $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$ and $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}$. Since $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ varies at the firm-year level, its direct effects will be captured by the interaction of firm and year fixed effects in Equation 11. Therefore, we interact $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ with $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$ to estimate the effect of marketing support for skilled managers as predicted by Implication 2. We also introduce a triple interaction between $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}$, $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ and $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$ to capture the differential effects for skilled managers with different levels of their own visibility. For completeness, we further add two additional interactions, $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}$ and $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$, to fully capture the effects of complementarities between manager skill, visibility, and the firm's marketing support. As a result, we have:

$$C_{mft} = C_{mft}^{team} + C_{mft}^{sales},$$

where

$$C_{mft}^{team} = \left[1_{Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled\ Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team_{mft}} \right],$$

$$C_{mft}^{sales} = \left[1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}, 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}} \right].$$

One threat to the identification of the sales effect is that firms with more productive managers may choose to invest more in marketing and advertising. We alleviate this concern by instrumenting the size of the sales team with the average size of sales teams of other firms in the previous year. The underlying assumption is that the investments in sales teams are driven by the investments of competitor firms, but the latter does not directly affect the revenue or compensation of individual managers, conditional on a rich set of control variables. In Section 5.1, we discuss this approach in detail, followed by supporting evidence for the identification assumption and the resulting IV estimates.

Additionally, several channels highlighted by prior work can explain why the effects of skill on compensation vary. First, [Bénabou and Tirole \(2016\)](#) emphasize the role of labor market competi-

tion that can strengthen the effect of the incentives. The interaction of firm and year fixed effects in our econometric framework captures not only the effects of the overall labor market competition but also the effects of competition within a specific firm. Second, [Thanassoulis \(2012\)](#) shows that a stronger provision of incentives is more likely to arise in high-risk environments due to optimal risk-sharing schemes between employers and employees. To mitigate this concern, we control for the time-varying level of riskiness faced by individual firms through the interaction between firm and year fixed effects. We also control for the fraction of equity funds managed by individual managers to further ensure that our effects are not confounded by the level of occupation risk. Finally, [Gibbons and Murphy \(1992\)](#) show that younger managers can have weaker explicit incentives since they face stronger implicit incentive due to career concerns. We control for the effect of career concerns by adding the interaction between manager skill and experience in our robustness tests. We also control for a battery of other variables related to career concerns such as manager age and different types of experience. Restricting the sample to managers who switch firms or teams further mitigates bias arising from career concerns since we compare a manager's compensation right before and after she switches firms or teams within a firm.

4.3 The Effects of Team Capital and Firm Advertising

Table 4 presents the estimation results for manager compensation and expected fee revenue.²⁵ The unit of observation is a manager in a given year. Since our set of control variables (described in Section 4.1) includes manager skill, we account for the manager-level performance-based component of compensation ([Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#)). Further, the interaction of firm and year fixed effects allows us to capture time-varying firm profits, revenue and performance, which have been shown to be important determinants of manager compensation in [Ibert et al. \(2017\)](#).

Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A shows that else equal, skilled managers generate 7% higher fee revenues and receive 8% higher compensation in a given year. The estimated effects of skill on revenue and compensation are of the same sign, consistent with the standard principal-agent contracts where the principal rewards an agent's input that increases total output.

However, not all the inputs have the same effects on revenue and compensation. As shown in Section 3, when the firm's inputs are complementary to a manager's inputs, such inputs, while

²⁵With rational expectation, the actual revenue in period $t + 1$ is used to proxy the expected revenue.

revenue-enhancing, can reduce the compensation that the manager receives. We focus on two such inputs: team assignment and firm advertising.

Team Capital As shown in Column (1) of Panel A, for less skilled managers, being on a team is associated with an increase of 29 log points (34 percentage points) in revenue. Being on a skilled team leads to an additional 41 log points (50 percentage points) increase in revenue. Moreover, the team effects are stronger for skilled managers. Skilled managers on teams generate an additional 19 log points (21 percentage points) in revenue relative to less skilled managers. If a skilled manager works with a skilled team, fee revenue increases by an additional 25 log points (28 percentage points). The combined economic effect of the team variables on the productivity of skilled managers is quite large, being equal to 49 percentage points. The large positive effects of $\left[1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Team_{mft}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Skilled Team_{mft}}\right]$ indicate the degree of complementarity between a manager's own skill and the skill of her teammates.

Despite that team capital has substantial positive effects on managers' production output, it generates opposite effects on the current compensation of managers. Column (2) shows that for more skilled managers, being on a team is associated with a 4 percentage points decline in compensation, while being on a skilled team further reduces the compensation by 15 log points (16 percentage points). The magnitude of the combined effect of team skill on compensation of skilled managers equals 20 percentage points.

With the inclusion of manager fixed effects, the findings above are unlikely to be driven by manager-specific time-invariant omitted factors that could induce positive assortative matching between skilled managers and skilled teams. If it was indeed the case, we should observe the firm support variables affect the expected revenue and manager compensation in the same direction. But the estimates show the opposite. These patterns are also unlikely to be driven by the average skill within the firm (as opposed to team-specific skill) or by other time-varying factors at the firm level (i.e. the total number of portfolio managers) since we are comparing managers working with the same firm in a given year. It is thus the skill of the specific team rather than the aggregate level of skill within the firm that matters the most.

A legitimate concern is that the same manager might take different roles in teams at different career stages. If the change in roles is correlated with not only her propensity to be matched with a team and team skill but also with her compensation or productivity, this could introduce an-

other bias into our key estimates. To address this concern, we further control for the interaction between manager fixed effects and the experience indicator. Thus, we are comparing the same manager in a given career period associated with the same firm but switching between two different teams. Columns (3)-(4) show that the estimated coefficients remain stable and comparable to those from columns (1)-(2). Appendix Table B6 further repeats the specifications using the split ratio to measure compensation instead. The patterns are similar to what we find here.

Taken together, we find strong support for Implication 1 from Section 3. Working with a skilled team enhances a manager's future productivity but lowers her current compensation. Since teams are assigned by the firm, the evidence is consistent with our theoretical framework of joint production whereby managers face a trade-off between higher monetary compensation received in the current period and positive externalities from fund family that enhance future productivity.

Marketing Support Panel B repeats the specifications from Panel A, but with the addition of interactions between manager visibility, manager skill, and the size of the firm's sales team. Again, columns (1)-(2) control for manager fixed effects and the interaction between firm and year fixed effects, while columns (3)-(4) further control for the interaction between manager fixed effects and the experience indicator. The results are highly consistent across different specifications and we focus our discussion below on the last two columns.

Column (3) shows that a skilled manager in a given career stage generates 4 percentage points higher total revenue when she is more known to investors via media coverage. The estimated manager visibility effect is comparable to the corresponding manager skill effect. This suggests that visibility is nearly as important as investment skill for determining fund revenue, consistent with the sizable information frictions faced by mutual fund investors found in [Roussanov, Ruan and Wei \(2021\)](#). In addition, conditional on being known to investors, a highly-skilled manager is more likely to be chosen, indicating the complementarity between skill and visibility.

As shown in Table 1, managers differ substantially in their own visibility. As a result, firms' investment in marketing and sales provides an important source of production complementarity that benefits different managers differently. Column (3) shows that, for skilled managers with low visibility, working for a firm with a large sales team increases revenues 41 log points (51 percentage points). Such effect is reduced by 7 log points to 34 log points (40 percentage points) for skilled managers with high visibility. This is again intuitive as managers with high visibility

have developed their own reputation and hence benefit less from the firm-level marketing effort to increase investors' awareness.

Turning to compensation, column (4) reveals that managers' visibility and firms' investment in a sales team, although both revenue-enhancing, have opposite effects on manager compensation. For a skilled manager, being highly visible increases her pay by 3 percentage points. Similar to investment skill, visibility is an important manager-level determinant of revenue. Its positive effect on manager pay is consistent with the common wisdom on performance-based contracts where the revenue is used to form a basis for compensation contracts. On the other hand, working for a firm with a large sales team reduces compensation by 19 log points (21 percentage points) for skilled managers. Such effect is reduced by 7 percentage points to 12 log points (13 percentage points) for managers who are highly visible. The fact that a firm's marketing support weakens the relationship between pay and investment skill is fully consistent with Implication 2. It highlights the strong demand from "average" managers, particularly those with low visibility, for firm support in advertising and marketing. Such need gives rise to compensation externalities within the fund family, which is crucial for understanding the role of incentive-based contracts in the mutual fund industry.

Overall, Table 4 shows that asset management teams and sales teams, both assembled by the firms, provide important production complementarity to an individual manager's own skills.²⁶ Consistent with the framework, we find that managers are willing to trade their current monetary compensation for higher expected future productivity, enhanced by either the firm's team assignment or marketing support or both.

5 Robustness Checks

We report several baseline robustness checks for the regressions in Table 4. First, Appendix Table B7 reports the results from the same regression specifications using manager's and team's alpha as measures of skill instead of the skill measure from Berk and Van Binsbergen (2015). We find that

²⁶The effects of firm support remain large when interpreted in standard deviations of an outcome variable. Being on a skilled team increases log revenue by 0.34 standard deviations and reduces log compensation by 0.25 standard deviations. Working for a firm with a large sales team increases the log revenue of skilled managers by 0.52 standard deviations and reduces their log compensation by 0.44 standard deviations.

the main results are robust to using alpha as a measure of skill. Second, in Appendix Table B8, we add interactions between skill and experience to examine whether the effects of team and marketing variables are confounded by the effects of career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy (1992)). The results show that the effects of firm support remain robust, and they also do not vary with manager experience. Finally, Appendix Table B9 shows that the results are robust to the alternative specification where changes in compensation and revenue are used as outcome variables.

The rich interactions of fixed effects in our baseline specifications help address the sorting of managers based on time-invariant unobserved characteristics. However, one might still be concerned about unobserved time-varying *manager-firm specific* characteristics. For example, a firm could decide to change its distribution network or expand its research division. Managers can also gain fundraising ability or investment skill over time. If these changes occur independently, they would have been captured by the inclusion of the interaction of firm and year fixed effects, as well as the interaction between manager and experience fixed effects. However, if these changes are correlated, our estimates of production complementarity effects can be biased. For example, this can happen when managers with improving investment skill or other unobserved abilities are more likely to join firms that invest more in research or advertising infrastructure (and hence have skilled teams to partner the manager with or larger sales teams).

We address this additional selection bias by using two approaches: (i) exploiting variation within a sample of managers who switch firms or teams within a firm, and (ii) the instrumental variables. The former helps address the endogeneity of both team-related and firm-related variables. The latter has a specific focus on addressing the endogeneity of the firm's sales team size.

5.1 Robustness Checks using Switcher Samples

We construct samples of managers who switch between firms or between teams within firms. Using the samples of switchers allows us to compare the outcomes immediately before and immediately after the transition event. If manager-specific and firm-specific unobservables do not change simultaneously and dramatically over this short time period, this comparison helps mitigate the sorting bias.

Figure 4 shows the likelihood of switching firms by experience and age. Portfolio managers

are most likely to switch firms in the middle of their careers. The probability of switching is the highest for managers with 10-15 years of industry experience, being equal to 14%. It is lower for managers with less than 10 years or more than 15 years of experience. We find a similar pattern across age groups where the likelihood of switching peaks at 14.8% for managers who are 40-50 years old.

Table 5 presents the information on a number of variables a year before and immediately after the transition for 98 transitions across firms that we identify. On average, portfolio managers experience a large increase in both compensation and productivity around the transition event. For the average transition, the compensation increases by 50 log points (65 percentage points) and the revenue unconditionally increases by 38 log points (46 percentage points).

At the same time, the average likelihood of being on a team declines by 22 percentage points, and the average likelihood of working for a firm with large sales teams declines by 29 percentage points. After the transition, the managers are also less likely to work with skilled teams, conditional on staying on a team, but this difference is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the transitions occurring later in the manager's career. Mid-career managers may have already accumulated the benefits of teamwork and marketing support, and now they move to smaller firms that offer higher compensation but less support.

We next present a series of regression tests, examining how transitions across firms affect compensation and revenue, conditional on transition characteristics. To provide a granular description of transitions, we create a set of indicator variables to account for a variety of transition characteristics. The indicator variables with $0 \rightarrow 1$ superscript equal one if the manager becomes a team member ($1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$), moves to a skilled team ($1_{Skilled Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$), or moves to a firm with a large sales team ($1_{Large Sales Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$). We also create a set of indicator variables with $1 \rightarrow 0$ superscript to characterize the "reverse" transitions: the manager becomes independent ($1_{Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$), moves to a less skilled team ($1_{Skilled Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$), or to a firm with a small sales team ($1_{Large Sales Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$). Our outcome variables are the log-changes in compensation and revenue within one year around the transition. All the specifications include new firm, previous firm, and year fixed effects.

The results in Table 6 are highly consistent with our baseline results from Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) show that transition from being independent to being on a team is associated with a 10 percentage points increase in revenue and a 27 log points (31 percentage points) reduction in

compensation. If a manager becomes a member of a skilled team, the revenue increases by 92 log points (150 percentage points) and the compensation declines by 39 percentage points. On the other hand, becoming independent is associated with increased compensation but not necessarily a change in revenue. This is consistent with the fact that the switchers are typically mid-career managers, as shown in Figure 4. These managers have already accumulated the network capital and reputation from their prior work experience and need less firm-level support from the new firm. As a result, the new firm needs to offer higher compensation in order to attract them. Taken together, these results provide additional support for Implication 1. The estimates on the sales team are also consistent with the framework's predictions. Moving from a firm with a small sales team to a firm with a large sales team is associated with an increase in revenue and a decline in compensation, while a reverse transition leads to an increase in compensation and a decline in revenue. Columns (2) and (4) further show that the effects of being on a team and transitioning to skilled teams are larger for skilled managers, consistent with our main results.

In sum, our results from the sample of transitions across firms are highly consistent with our baseline results. In Appendix Table B10, we additionally examine transitions across teams within the same firms. We only focus on the effects of teamwork since the immediate variation in sales team size is small. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. As expected, the changes in compensation associated with transitioning within firms are smaller relative to the transitions across firms.

5.2 Instrumental Variables Approach

Marketing and advertising are one of the important competition dimensions in the mutual fund industry and, therefore, may generate potential endogeneity concerns in our main empirical specifications. For example, unobserved firm history, corporate culture and market trends could drive up a firm's revenue, compensation, and marketing spending simultaneously and hence induce an upward bias in an OLS estimation of the sales team effect. As long as these unobserved factors vary at the firm-year level, they are less of an issue given the inclusion of the interaction of firm and year fixed effects. However, one may still be concerned that for a given firm in a given year, the need for advertising depends on the expected productivity of individual managers. To address this, we propose to instrument the size of the sales team by the average size of the sales

team across other firms in the previous year.

Our instrument is the lagged cross-sectional average of $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ indicator for all other firms, excluding firm f . The underlying identification assumption is that the firm’s investment in marketing and advertising depends on the investment of its competitors. This is motivated by the evidence from [Roussanov, Ruan and Wei \(2021\)](#) where funds engage in marketing “arm race” since they compete for the same pool of investors. If the competitors invest more in a given year, then the firm can respond by increasing its own sales team over the next year. The exclusion restriction is that the competitors’ sales team size does not directly affect current compensation and productivity of portfolio managers in the firm other than through its effect on the firm’s current sales team, conditional on a rich set of control variables and combinations of fixed effects that account for the unobserved history of firms and unobserved characteristics of managers.

We first examine the power of the instrument. Panel A of [Table 7](#) presents the results from regressing $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ indicator on $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{t-1}}}$, the average industry sales team size in the previous year, excluding the firm itself. The relation between the variables is significantly positive and robust across a number of specifications with a variety of control variables and fixed effects. Intuitively, firm i ’s marketing investment could decrease firm j ’s probability of being known to the investors and force firm j to also invest more in marketing, resulting in a wasteful “arms race” competition as shown in [Roussanov et al. \(2021\)](#). This provides the necessary variation underlying our identification of the sale team effects.

Recall that our main specifications in [Table 4](#) do not directly include $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ indicator since we control for the interaction of firm and year fixed effects. Instead, it includes the three interactions of $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ with other variables: 1) the interaction with $1_{Skilled_{mt}}$; 2) the interaction with $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}$; and 3) the triple interaction between all the variables. Therefore, we treat these three interaction variables as endogenous and instrument them using the corresponding interactions with $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{t-1}}}$. We follow a standard 2SLS procedure as described below.

In the first stage, we run three separate regressions, regressing each of the three endogenous variables separately on all the three instruments and control variables from the main specification. We next calculate fitted values for each endogenous variable. Our first-stage regression specification is given by

$$z_{mft} = \lambda_f \times \lambda_t + \lambda_m \times 1_{Experienced_{mft}} + \beta C^{team}_{mft} + \psi I_{mft} + \gamma X_{mft} + \epsilon_{mft}. \quad (12)$$

In this specification, z_{mft} is an endogenous interaction variable: $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$, $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ or $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$. C^{team} is the set of exogenous interaction variables that capture asset management team complementarities.²⁷ I_{mft} is the vector of three instruments:

$$I_{mft} = \left[1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{\widehat{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}, 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{\widehat{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}, 1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{\widehat{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}} \right].$$

Table 8 shows that Cragg-Donald F-statistic from the first stage equals 26.51 for compensation and 31.29 for revenue, suggesting that the first stage power of our instruments is very strong. Hence the estimates are unlikely to be affected by a weak-instrument issue.

While the exclusion restriction cannot be tested directly, we provide indirect evidence by checking whether our proposed instruments are correlated with variation in the outcome variables which is left unexplained by our main independent variables. In particular, we first compute the residuals from our main regressions in Table 4. These residuals capture the variation unexplained by $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$, $1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ and $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team_{ft}}$ indicators and the full set of control variables. We next regress the residuals on I_{mft} and report the results in Panel B of Table 7. Across all the outcome variables, we find that our proposed instrument interactions are uncorrelated with the residuals, providing additional support for our identification strategy.

In the second stage, we regress each of our dependent variables on the fitted values from the first stage and all the control variables. Our second-stage regression specification is given by:

$$y_{mft} = \lambda_f \times \lambda_t + \lambda_m \times 1_{Experienced_{mft}} + \beta C^{team}_{mft} + \psi \hat{z}_{mft} + \gamma X_{mft} + \epsilon_{mft}. \quad (13)$$

In this specification, y_{mft} is our independent variable (compensation or revenue), and \hat{z}_{mft} is the set of the three fitted values from the first-stage regressions.

²⁷ X_{mft} is our standard set of control variables from Equation 11, with the addition of $1_{Skilled_{mt}} \times 1_{High\ Visibility_{mt}}$. This interaction variable does not include the sales team size and therefore is not instrumented.

Table 8 reports the results. Across all the dependent variables, most of the 2SLS coefficients show magnitudes comparable to their OLS counterparts from Panel B of Table 4. They also exhibit similar levels of statistical significance, suggesting that our main results appear to be robust to the instrumental variables estimation. This is not surprising, as marketing is a firm-level decision that varies over time. Most of the omitted factors related to this decision are already controlled for in the main specifications with the inclusion of the interaction between firm and year fixed effects.

6 Implication for Pay-Performance Sensitivity

In their analysis of compensation of Swedish portfolio managers, [Ibert et al. \(2017\)](#) (IKVV) find that a manager's compensation responds weakly to her own performance or revenue but strongly to firm-level revenue, profits and performance. Using the Israeli portfolio manager data, we repeat the baseline specifications in IKVV and find similar evidence. The consistently small observed pay-performance sensitivity presents a quantitative puzzle for the standard incentive-based contracts that link managers' pay to their performance. In this section, we address this by exploring the role of production complementarities between managers and firms in a joint production process. We follow the IKVV's specifications as close as possible and, therefore, include fund performance as measured by its alpha instead of the measure of skill from [Berk and Van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#) which we use throughout the rest of the paper. While the specifications are similar to those from the main analysis, the focus now is on the magnitude of pay-performance sensitivity, and as a result, the key variable of interest is the fund's risk-adjusted performance (alpha) instead of firm externalities.

Our baseline results confirm IKVV's findings on economically modest effects of performance on pay. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that a 1% increase in fund revenues is associated with a 0.22% increase in manager compensation. Column (2) shows that a 1% increase in fund performance increases manager compensation by 0.16%. Both are comparable to IKVV's estimates.²⁸ One key contribution of IKVV is to show that firm-level variables, such as firm profits and revenues, are important determinants of manager compensation. In column (3), we capture these

²⁸The effects are also comparable in terms of economic magnitudes. An increase of one standard deviation in log revenue increases compensation by 38.4% (28.1% in IKVV). An increase of one standard deviation in log abnormal return increases compensation by 1.8% (2.98% in IKVV)

firm-level variables by including the interaction of firm and year fixed effects. In addition, we include time-varying manager and portfolio characteristics. The estimates of pay-performance and pay-revenue elasticities slightly shrink, and the R^2 increases to 0.60, again consistent with IKVV.

The evidence from IKVV and the replicated specifications above points to weak observed pay-performance sensitivity, inconsistent with the standard incentive-based contracts that link managers' pay to their performance. The conceptual framework that we developed in Section 3 provides a testable explanation. In particular, since IKVV measure skill by the fund's risk-adjusted performance, the pay-performance sensitivity can be interpreted as a manager's skill premium. Proposition 2 states that in a world where managers and the firm work together to produce, we expect that the pay-performance sensitivity would be mitigated by the firm-level input if such input contributes positively to a manager's productivity. Given that both team skills and firm marketing support are complementary to an individual manager's performance, a manager will be willing to receive lower compensation for her performance in exchange for being matched with more skilled team or receiving more marketing support from the firm. Moreover, to the extent that managers differ in how much they benefit from such firm support, their pay-performance sensitivities also vary.

In column (4), we test this explanation by including two firm-level inputs: team allocation and marketing support. Consistent with the above hypothesis, we find that the pay-performance sensitivity depends crucially on how well managers are supported by the firm. For example, while being matched to a random team has no significant impact on the pay-performance sensitivity, being matched to a skilled portfolio management team almost completely washes away the positive pay-performance sensitivity. Similarly, being matched to a large sales team eliminates most of the pay-performance sensitivity. In contrast, for managers who have high visibility and hence less need for firm marketing, their pay-performance sensitivity almost doubles. These estimates remain robust when we further control for manager fixed effects in column (5).

Taken together, our results reveal that small average pay-performance sensitivities may mask substantial heterogeneities in incentives underlying the compensation contract. The established and skilled managers benefit less from team skill or firm marketing, hence their pay is more sensitive to their own performance. On the other hand, managers who rely heavily on team skills and firm marketing would willingly accept less reward for their own performance in order to receive

better firm support that enhances their expected productivity. The latter represent the majority of the fund managers given that the industry is highly skewed such that only a small number of “superstar” managers do not require substantial support from the firm. This explains why the estimated pay-performance sensitivities appear small on average.

Our findings are highly consistent with IKVV’s message that “managers’ compensation cannot, and should not, be evaluated in isolation.” In particular, by explicitly accounting for the complementarities between fund managers and fund families (firms), we show that a manager’s compensation depends not only on her own performance (as in [Ma, Tang and Gomez \(2019\)](#)), the firm’s overall performance (as in [Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman \(2017\)](#)), but more importantly on the idiosyncratic match between firm-level resources and individual talents. Evidence for the latter is novel to the literature.

7 Implication for Investor Flows

Given our focus on the supply-side of the mutual fund industry, we have abstracted from the role of investors in our analysis so far. A large and important literature has established strong evidence that mutual fund investor flows strongly respond to the fund performance ([Sirri and Tufano \(1998\)](#), [Chevalier and Ellison \(1997\)](#), [Berk and Green \(2004\)](#)). It is important to note that acknowledging production complementarities contributes to this literature in two ways. First, the actual asset management is conducted by portfolio managers whose incentives are shaped by their contracts with the firm. Even with investors providing performance-based incentives to fund families/firms, if firms do not incorporate these incentives into their compensation for fund managers, the efficiency of the flow-performance relationship would still be questionable. In this regard, our evidence above for the incentive alignment between firms and managers provides reassuring support.

Second, if production complementarities are indeed important, then investors should chase not only investment skill but also managers that are better supported by the firm. This is because such within-firm externalities increase managers’ expected future productivity, as shown in [Section 3](#). [Appendix Table B11](#) provides evidence for this hypothesis. While high-performing managers attract more investor flows, such effects are much larger when these managers work

with skilled teams and receive support from large sales teams.

8 Conclusion

This paper studies the importance of production complementarities in explaining variations in productivity and compensation in asset management. We examine a framework that specifies how production complementarities between managers and firms affect manager expected productivity and hence compensation. We apply this framework to the asset management industry and provide novel evidence that a manager's productivity and compensation are shaped not only by their own performance and overall firm profitability but, more importantly by how they integrate with the rest of the firm. Production complementarities naturally arise in the mutual fund industry because most managers work in teams and firms know more than investors about managerial ability. The former implies that skilled managers benefit from working with skilled peers, the latter implies that skilled but less visible managers benefit from being advertised. Using a unique dataset on compensation of Israeli mutual fund managers, we find that managers working with more skilled teammates and receiving more advertising receive lower salaries today in return for higher expected productivity. Such effects are stronger for more skilled and less visible managers. The results are consistent with the incentive provision theory for forward-looking agents in the presence of production complementarities.

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Figure 1: Compensation, Revenue and Split Ratio by Decile

This figure presents the fractions of compensation and revenue as well as the average split ratio by deciles of distribution of the underlying variable. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager's compensation to her fee revenues.




Figure 2: Variance Decomposition

This figure presents the results of variance decomposition for compensation, split ratio and productivity of portfolio managers. Each variable is regressed against a set of manager and firm characteristics, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects, as explained in Section 4. We refer to the distribution of the estimates of firm fixed effects as “between-firm” variation and the distribution of the residuals as “within-firm” variation. $\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})$ is the natural logarithm of the manager’s compensation in shekels. $\text{Log}(\text{Revenue})$ is the natural logarithm of the manager’s fee revenue. Split Ratio is the ratio of the manager’s compensation to her fee revenues.




Figure 3: Co-managed Funds and Managers on Teams

This figure presents the times series of the fraction of managers with teams and the fraction of funds which are co-managed. The fund is defined as co-managed if it is managed by more than one manager.




Figure 4: Job Switching Rates, Experience and Age

This figure presents the likelihood of switching firms across experience and age groups. *Job Switching Rate* is the fraction of managers which switch firms within their respective group.




Table 1: Summary Statistics

This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A presents the information at the manager-year level. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager's compensation to her fee revenues. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. *Manager Age* is the manager's age in years. *Fund Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been responsible for the fund's management. *MF Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the mutual fund industry. *AM Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry. *Visibility* is the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel. 1_{MBA} indicator equals one if the manager has an MBA degree. 1_{MA} indicator equals one if the manager has a non-MBA Master's degree. 1_{Equity} indicator equals one if the fraction of equities in manager portfolio is above 50%. 1_{Owner} indicator equals one if the manager owns the firm. $1_{Extra\ Role}$ indicator equals one if the manager has an extra role in the company (such as CEO or head of the investment committee). *AUM* is the assets under management. *Fee* is the percentage fee. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund's inception. *Number of Funds* is the number of funds in the manager's portfolio. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. *Team Size* is the number of managers on the team, being equal to zero for independent managers. *Number of Teams* is the number of teams that the manager is working with. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive.

Panel A: Manager-year Level	N	Mean	SD	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
Manager Characteristics								
<i>Compensation</i> (MM, Shekels)	1,264	0.42	0.59	0.09	0.17	0.29	0.46	0.74
<i>Split Ratio</i> (%)	1,264	12.31	18.22	2.31	4.38	9/.90	23.62	42.40
$1_{Skilled}$ (MM, Shekels)	1,264	0.35	0.47	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Manager Age</i> (years)	1,264	39.56	8.54	31	33	38	44	51
<i>Fund Experience</i> (years)	1,264	2.58	2.87	0	0.78	1.88	3.66	5.82
<i>MF Industry Experience</i> (years)	1,264	6.14	6.40	0	2	4	8	14
<i>AM Industry Experience</i> (years)	1,264	8.54	7.55	1	3	6	12	19
<i>Visibility</i> (number of articles)	1,264	7.93	11.71	0	0	5	13	19
1_{MBA}	1,264	0.49	0.50	0	0	0	1	1
1_{MA}	1,264	0.56	0.49	0	0	1	1	1
1_{Equity}	1,264	0.23	0.43	0	0	0	0	1
1_{Owner}	1,264	0.18	0.38	0	0	0	0	1
$1_{Extra\ Role}$	1,264	0.12	0.33	0	0	0	0	1
Portfolio Characteristics								
<i>Revenue</i> (MM, Shekels)	1,264	4.86	6.96	0.10	0.54	2.23	6.57	12.07
<i>AUM</i> (MM, Shekels)	1,264	722.35	1113.57	17.7	61.76	313.07	927.07	1920.1
<i>Fee</i> (%)	1,264	1.01	0.63	0.34	0.57	0.91	1.38	1.97
<i>Fund Age</i> (years)	1,264	8.62	5.80	2.41	4.75	7.46	10.84	16.04
<i>Number of Funds</i>	1,264	4.6	5.04	1	2	4	9	14
Team Characteristics								
1_{Team}	1,264	0.75	0.43	0	0	1	1	1
<i>Team Size</i>	1,264	0.70	0.94	0	0	0.29	1	2
<i>Number of Teams</i>	1,264	1.55	1.96	0	0	1	1	2
$1_{Skilled\ Team}$	1,264	0.37	0.48	0	0	0	1	1

Table 1 - Continued

This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel B presents the information at the fund-year level. Panel C presents the information at the firm-year level. *AUM* is the assets under management. *Fee* is the percentage fee. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund's inception. $\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1})$ is the estimate of fund past performance where α_{it-1} is the annualized intercept of the multi-benchmark model for fund returns (see Section 2.4 for details). *Sales Team* is the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm. *Number of Managers* is the number of portfolio managers that the firm employs. *Number of Funds* is the number of funds that the firm operates.

Panel B: Fund-year Level	N	Mean	SD	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
<i>AUM</i> (MM, Shekels)	13,481	110.01	186.13	3.9	12.2	40	117.7	292.2
<i>Fee</i> (%)	13,481	0.95	0.76	0.11	0.33	0.88	1.57	2.12
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1})$	13,481	-0.01	0.05	-0.08	-0.03	-0.01	0.006	0.035
<i>Fund Age</i> (years)	13,481	7.94	7.77	0.91	2.41	5.50	10.75	19.08
Panel C: Firm-year Level	N	Mean	SD	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
<i>AUM</i> (MM, Shekels)	440	2075.12	3998.30	14.95	59.8	353.6	2257.96	6547.78
<i>Fee</i> (%)	440	1.13	0.67	0.48	0.76	1.15	1.42	1.93
<i>Sales Team</i>	261	0.42	0.32	0.19	0.27	0.36	0.55	0.74
<i>Number of Managers</i>	440	2.87	3.04	1	1	1	4	7.5
<i>Number of Funds</i>	440	24.71	37.88	2	3	8	29	64

Table 2: Differences in Revenue and Compensation Across Managers

This table presents the differences in manager characteristics across subsamples. Panel A shows the differences between managers who work with skilled and less skilled teams. Panel B shows the differences between managers who work for firms with large sales teams and small sales teams. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{Skilled Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large Sales Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median.

Panel A: Effects of Portfolio Management Team Skill			
Manager Characteristics	$1_{Skilled Team = 1}$	$1_{Skilled Team = 0}$	$1_{Skilled Team = 1}$ vs. $1_{Skilled Team = 0}$
$1_{Skilled = 1}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.40	0.49	-0.09***
<i>Revenue</i>	7.23	2.89	4.34**
$1_{Skilled = 0}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.32	0.37	-0.05**
<i>Revenue</i>	5.18	2.04	3.14**
$1_{Skilled = 1}$ vs. $1_{Skilled = 0}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.08**	0.12***	-0.04**
<i>Revenue</i>	2.05*	0.84**	1.21***

Panel B: Effects of Sales Team Size			
Manager Characteristics	$1_{Large Sales Team = 1}$	$1_{Large Sales Team = 0}$	$1_{Large Sales Team = 1}$ vs. $1_{Large Sales Team = 0}$
$1_{Skilled = 1}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.39	0.50	-0.11**
<i>Revenue</i>	6.69	3.97	2.72**
$1_{Skilled = 0}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.25	0.30	-0.05**
<i>Revenue</i>	3.86	2.57	1.29*
$1_{Skilled = 1}$ vs. $1_{Skilled = 0}$			
<i>Compensation</i>	0.14**	0.20**	-0.06***
<i>Revenue</i>	2.83	1.40*	1.43**

Table 3: Role of Matching in Explaining Compensation and Revenues

This table presents the R-squared from regressing portfolio manager compensation and revenue on manager and portfolio characteristics, and combinations of fixed effects. *Compensation* is the manager’s compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager’s fee revenue. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager’s compensation to her fee revenue. All the specifications include control variables such as $1_{Skilled}$, *Manager Age*, *Fund Experience*, *MF Industry Experience*, *AM Industry Experience*, 1_{MBA} , 1_{MA} , *Fund Age*, *Number of Funds*, $1_{High\ Visibility}$, 1_{Equity} , 1_{Owner} and $1_{Extra\ Role}$. The detailed results are reported in Tables B3-B5 in the Appendix.

	R-squared					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(5)
$y=Log(Compensation_t)$	25%	47%	58%	68%	80%	90%
$y=Log(Revenue_{t+1})$	38%	57%	66%	73%	90%	94%
$y=Split\ Ratio_t$	22%	38%	45%	60%	68%	89%
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Firm \times Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Manager \times Firm FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Manager \times Team FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Table 4: Production Complementarity Effects on Manager Productivity and Compensation

This table presents the results from regressing manager compensation and revenue on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. $Compensation$ is the manager's compensation in shekels. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large Sales Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

	Panel A: Effects of Team Capital			
$y =$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$Log(Revenue_{t+1})$	$Log(Compensation_t)$	$Log(Revenue_{t+1})$	$Log(Compensation_t)$
$1_{Skilled}$	0.07** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)
1_{Team}	0.29** (0.14)	0.02 (0.09)	0.28** (0.14)	0.02 (0.09)
$1_{Skilled Team}$	0.41** (0.20)	-0.11** (0.05)	0.32** (0.17)	-0.10** (0.05)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	0.19** (0.08)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.07)	-0.06*** (0.02)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled Team}$	0.25** (0.11)	-0.15** (0.07)	0.26** (0.12)	-0.19** (0.09)
Observations	1,108	1,108	1,108	1,108
R-squared	0.92	0.86	0.93	0.88
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4 - Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel B: Effects of Marketing Support	$\text{Log}(\text{Revenue}_{t+1})$	$\text{Log}(\text{Compensation}_t)$	$\text{Log}(\text{Revenue}_{t+1})$	$\text{Log}(\text{Compensation}_t)$
$y =$				
1_{Skilled}	0.06** (0.02)	0.12** (0.05)	0.06** (0.02)	0.11** (0.05)
1_{Team}	0.16** (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)	0.13** (0.06)	0.05 (0.14)
$1_{\text{Skilled Team}}$	0.33** (0.15)	-0.14*** (0.04)	0.39* (0.20)	-0.12** (0.05)
$1_{\text{Skilled}} \times 1_{\text{Team}}$	0.12** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)
$1_{\text{Skilled}} \times 1_{\text{Skilled Team}}$	0.21** (0.09)	-0.15** (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.07)
$1_{\text{Skilled}} \times 1_{\text{High Visibility}}$	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)
$1_{\text{Skilled}} \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$	0.51** (0.24)	-0.21** (0.10)	0.41** (0.19)	-0.19* (0.10)
$1_{\text{High Visibility}} \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$	0.03 (0.15)	-0.15** (0.07)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.14** (0.07)
$1_{\text{Skilled}} \times 1_{\text{High Visibility}} \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$	-0.07** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Observations	938	938	938	938
R-squared	0.94	0.85	0.96	0.86
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Manager FE \times 1 _{Experienced}	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 5: Transition Across Firms: Comparison of Manager Characteristics

This table compares the characteristics of managers who moved between firms. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager's compensation to her fee revenues. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large Sales Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Transitions of Managers Across Firms (N = 98)		
	Year Before Transition	Year After Transition	After vs. Before
<i>Log(Compensation)</i>	-1.91	-1.41	0.50***
t-stat			3.29
<i>Log(Revenue)</i>	0.17	0.55	0.38**
t-stat			2.29
<i>Split Ratio</i>	0.08	0.22	0.14**
t-stat			2.37
1_{Team}	0.55	0.33	-0.22**
t-stat			2.11
$1_{Skilled Team}$	0.56	0.49	-0.07
t-stat			0.85
$1_{Large Sales Team}$	0.93	0.64	-0.29**
t-stat			2.08

Table 6: Transition Across Firms: Effects of Production Complementarities on Compensation and Revenue

This table presents the results from regressing one-year changes in manager compensation and revenue on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics for the sample of managers who switched firms. The changes are calculated as the differences in the outcome variables between the last year at the old firm and the first year at the new firm. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$ indicator equals one if the manager starts working with the team at the new firm after being independent at the old firm. $1_{Skilled\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$ indicator equals one if the manager joins the team with positive average skill at the new firm, after working with the negative-average-skill team at the old firm. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds at the new firm is above the median, and it is below the median at the old firm. All the variables with $1 \rightarrow 0$ superscript are indicator variables for the reverse transitions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$y = \Delta \text{Log}(\text{Compensation})_{t,t+1}$		$y = \Delta \text{Log}(\text{Revenue})_{t,t+1}$	
$1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$	-0.27** (0.13)	-0.24** (0.12)	0.10** (0.05)	0.14** (0.06)
$1_{Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$	0.30** (0.13)	0.17** (0.07)	0.73 (0.46)	0.45 (0.63)
$1_{Skilled\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$	-0.39*** (0.12)	-0.42** (0.20)	0.92** (0.45)	0.75* (0.40)
$1_{Skilled\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$	0.64 (0.89)	0.30 (1.01)	0.52 (0.39)	0.21 (0.64)
$1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$	-0.28** (0.12)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.37** (0.14)	0.32* (0.16)
$1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$	0.29** (0.12)	0.30** (0.14)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.06)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		-0.22** (0.10)		0.17** (0.08)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		0.24 (0.65)		0.71 (0.92)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		-0.12** (0.06)		0.23** (0.10)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		0.89 (0.72)		0.54 (0.51)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		-0.38*** (0.13)		0.49* (0.25)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		1.82 (1.18)		-1.00 (0.74)

Table 6 - Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		0.22 (0.31)		0.25 (0.45)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		0.22** (0.11)		0.19* (0.10)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		0.67 (0.78)		0.34 (0.45)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		-1.54 (1.02)		1.98 (1.45)
Observations	98	98	98	98
R-squared	0.50	0.58	0.46	0.47
New Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Previous Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7: Validity Tests for Instrumental Variables Regressions

This table presents the validity tests for instrumental variables regressions in Table 8. Panel A shows the results from regressing $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ on $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$ equals the average of $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ across all the other firms in the previous year. Panel B presents the results from regressing the residuals from the regressions in Table 4 on I_{mft} , the full set of instruments. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. All the specifications include the control variables from Table 4. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

Panel A: Relation between $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ and $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$				
$y = 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}$	0.58*** (0.11)	0.58*** (0.15)	0.64*** (0.17)	0.72*** (0.20)
Observations	943	943	938	938
R-squared	0.21	0.38	0.59	0.61
Control variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	Yes	No
Manager FE $\times 1_{Experienced}$	No	No	No	Yes

Panel B: Relation between OLS Residuals and Instruments		
	(1)	(2)
$y = \text{Residual from Regression in Panel B of Table 4}$	Column (3): $\text{Log}(\text{Revenue}_{t+1})$	Column (4): $\text{Log}(\text{Compensation}_t)$
$1_{Skilled} \times \widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$	0.03 (0.19)	0.07 (0.24)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times \widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$	0.11 (0.22)	-0.12 (0.30)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times \widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$	-0.07 (0.28)	-0.21 (0.29)
Observations	938	938
R-squared	0.01	0.01

Table 8: Production Complementarity Effects: Instrumental Variables Approach

This table presents the results from regressing manager compensation and revenue on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator is instrumented by $\widehat{1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}_{t-1}}$, the average $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator across all the other firms in the previous year. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

<i>y</i> =	(1)	(2)
	<i>Log(Compensation_t)</i>	<i>Log(Revenue_{t+1})</i>
$1_{Skilled}$	0.08** (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)
1_{Team}	0.02 (0.03)	0.15** (0.07)
$1_{Skilled\ Team}$	-0.12** (0.06)	0.34** (0.15)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	-0.05* (0.02)	0.19* (0.10)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}$	-0.09** (0.04)	0.05 (0.14)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.05 (0.04)	0.12** (0.06)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.17** (0.07)	0.24** (0.11)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.11** (0.05)	0.11 (0.09)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.06** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.05)
Cragg-Donald F-statistic from the first stage:	25.61	31.29
Observations	938	938
R-squared	0.86	0.93
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes
Manager FE $\times 1_{Experienced}$	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes

Table 9: Production Complementarity Effects on Pay-Performance Sensitivity

This table compares our estimates to the estimates from [Ibert, Kaniel, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vestman \(2017\)](#), presenting the results from regressing manager compensation on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. *Compensation* is the manager’s compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager’s fee revenue. $\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1})$ is the estimate of fund performance where α_{it-1} is the annualized intercept of the multi-benchmark model for fund returns (see Section 2.4 for details). 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{\text{Skilled Team}}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager’s teams is positive. $1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. 1_{Skilled} indicator equals one if the manager’s skill is positive. $1_{\text{High Visibility}}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{\text{Experienced}}$ indicator equals one if the manager’s mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y=\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\text{Log}(\text{Revenue})$	0.22*** (0.01)		0.17** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1})$		0.16** (0.08)	0.15** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.22** (0.10)
1_{Team}			-0.08 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)
$1_{\text{Skilled Team}}$			-0.10** (0.05)	-0.24** (0.11)	-0.15** (0.06)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1}) \times 1_{\text{Team}}$				1.86 (1.44)	3.21 (3.55)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1}) \times 1_{\text{Skilled Team}}$				-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.23** (0.09)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1}) \times 1_{\text{High Visibility}}$				0.16** (0.07)	0.12** (0.06)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1}) \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$				-0.19** (0.09)	-0.11* (0.06)
$\text{Log}(1+\alpha_{it-1}) \times 1_{\text{High Visibility}} \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$				0.92 (1.19)	0.54 (1.78)
$1_{\text{High Visibility}} \times 1_{\text{Large Sales Team}}$				-0.11** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.07)
Observations	1,108	1,105	1,105	938	938
R-squared	0.19	0.01	0.60	0.69	0.84
Control Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	No	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Firm \times Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	No	No	Yes

Internet Appendix

A Constructing Benchmark Return

We use a five-benchmark model to evaluate the fund performance, deriving the fund's alpha and its passive benchmark return. This model was developed for the Israeli Ministry of Finance to compare long-term investment instruments such as pension funds and provident funds. The model uses five benchmarks as proxies for risk factors: two equity market indices, Tel Aviv 100 Index and the MSCI World Index, as well as the three bond indices: inflation-indexed corporate bonds, inflation-indexed government bonds and non-indexed government bonds ([Hamdani, Kandel, Mugerma and Yafeh \(2017\)](#)). We apply the same model for estimating the performance of mutual funds because their holdings are very similar to the holdings of the provident funds ([Shaton \(2017\)](#)).

In the main analysis, we estimate fund betas using fund-level monthly data in the following specification:

$$R_{ik} - R_k^{RF} = \alpha_i + \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{if} (R_{fk} - R_k^{RF}) + \epsilon_{ik}, \quad (14)$$

where $R_{ik} - R_k^{RF}$ is an excess return of fund i in month k above the risk free rate R_k^{RF} and $R_{fk} - R_k^{RF}$ is an excess return of factor f in month k . The risk-free rate R_k^{RF} is defined as monthly return on Israeli short-term (one year maturity) government bonds.

We follow [Berk and Van Binsbergen \(2015\)](#) and generate the fund's benchmark return multiplying the estimated fund betas by the annual excess returns on the indices in year t :

$$R_{it}^B = \sum_{f=1}^F \hat{\beta}_{if} (R_{ft} - R_t^{RF}). \quad (15)$$

Intuitively, benchmark return represents a return on the portfolio of passive assets that is the "closest" to the fund's asset holdings. This is the return that investors can achieve on their own purely relying on passive benchmarks that represent the alternative investment opportunity set.

B Additional Results

Figure B1: Sample Coverage

This figure presents the assets under management (AUM) of the entire Israeli mutual fund industry and the aggregated AUM of our sample.




Table B1: Sample Composition

This table presents the distribution of the sample mutual funds across asset classes.

Primary Asset Class	Number of Funds	Percentage by Count
Israeli Fixed Income - Broad Market	294	21%
Israeli Fixed Income - Sheqels	272	18%
Israeli Fixed Income - Corporate and Convertibles	206	15%
Israeli Fixed Income - Government	191	12%
Israeli Equity	159	11%
Global Equity	136	10%
Global Fixed Income	74	5%
Flexible	35	3%
Fund of Israeli Funds	34	2%
Leverage & Strategic	27	2%
Israeli Fixed Income - Foreign Currency	18	1%
Total	1446	

Table B2: Production Complementarity Effects on Skill and Visibility

This table presents the results from regressing future skill and visibility on current team and firm characteristics and their interactions with current manager characteristics. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$y = 1_{Skilled,t+1}$		$y = 1_{Visibility,t+1}$	
$1_{Skilled}$	0.26**	0.28**	0.19*	0.07
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)
1_{Team}	0.14	0.17		
	(0.09)	(0.09)		
$1_{Skilled\ Team}$	0.14**	0.14***		
	(0.07)	(0.06)		
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	0.04	0.04		
	(0.12)	(0.13)		
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}$	0.09**	0.06**		
	(0.04)	(0.03)		
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility}$			0.05	0.06
			(0.04)	(0.05)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.13**	0.12**
			(0.05)	(0.05)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.08**	0.09**
			(0.04)	(0.04)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.03	0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	963	944	911	896
R-squared	0.60	0.62	0.45	0.51
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table B3: The Determinants of Portfolio Manager Compensation

This table presents the results from regressing portfolio manager compensation on manager and portfolio characteristics and combinations of fixed effects. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. *Manager Age* is the manager's age in years. *Fund Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been responsible for the fund's management. *MF Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the mutual fund industry. *AM Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry. 1_{MBA} indicator equals one if the manager has an MBA degree. 1_{MA} indicator equals one if the manager has a non-MBA Master's degree. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund's inception. *Number of Funds* is the number of funds in the manager's portfolio. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. 1_{Equity} indicator equals one if the fraction of equities in manager portfolio is above 50%. 1_{Owner} indicator equals one if the manager owns the firm. $1_{Extra\ Role}$ indicator equals one if the manager has an extra role in the company (such as CEO or head of the investment committee). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y=\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$1_{Skilled}$	0.07** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
<i>Fund Age</i>	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
<i>Number of Funds</i>	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
<i>Manager Age</i>	0.02** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
<i>Fund Experience</i>	0.10*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.02)
<i>MF Industry Experience</i>	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>AM Industry Experience</i>	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
$1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.13** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)
1_{MBA}	0.32*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.10)	0.28*** (0.10)			
1_{MA}	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-0.20** (0.10)			
1_{Equity}	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	0.04* (0.03)
1_{Owner}	0.11** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.08* (0.05)			
$1_{Extra\ Role}$	0.07** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)			
Observations	1,242	1,222	1,222	1,221	1,132	1,175
R-squared	0.25	0.47	0.58	0.68	0.80	0.90
Firm FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Firm × Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Manager × Firm FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Manager × Team FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Table B4: The Determinants of Portfolio Manager Revenue

This table presents the results from regressing portfolio manager revenue on manager and portfolio characteristics and the combinations of fixed effects. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenues. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. *Manager Age* is the manager's age in years. *Fund Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been responsible for the fund's management. *MF Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the mutual fund industry. *AM Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry. 1_{MBA} indicator equals one if the manager has an MBA degree. 1_{MA} indicator equals one if the manager has a non-MBA Master's degree. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund's inception. *Number of Funds* is the number of funds in the manager's portfolio. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. 1_{Equity} indicator equals one if the fraction of equities in manager portfolio is above 50%. 1_{Owner} indicator equals one if the manager owns the firm. $1_{Extra\ Role}$ indicator equals one if the manager has an extra role in the company (such as CEO or head of the investment committee). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y = \text{Log}(\text{Revenue}_{t+1})$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$1_{Skilled}$	0.10** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
<i>Fund Age</i>	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
<i>Number of Funds</i>	0.09*** (0.00)	0.07*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)
<i>Manager Age</i>	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
<i>Fund Experience</i>	0.04** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
<i>MF Industry Experience</i>	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
<i>AM Industry Experience</i>	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
$1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.09** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)	0.08** (0.04)
1_{MBA}	0.15 (0.16)	0.03 (0.18)	0.06 (0.18)			
1_{MA}	-0.29* (0.16)	-0.21 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.17)			
1_{Equity}	-0.16** (0.07)	0.18** (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)
1_{Owner}	0.12 (0.13)	0.11 (0.15)	0.21 (0.15)			
$1_{Extra\ Role}$	0.10** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)			
Observations	1,216	1,195	1,195	1,194	1,107	1,137
R-squared	0.38	0.57	0.66	0.73	0.90	0.94
Firm FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Firm × Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Manager × Firm FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Manager × Team FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Table B5: The Determinants of Portfolio Manager Split Ratio

This table presents the results from regressing portfolio manager split ratio on manager and portfolio characteristics and combinations of fixed effects. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager's compensation to her fee revenues. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. *Manager Age* is the manager's age in years. *Fund Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been responsible for the fund's management. *MF Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the mutual fund industry. *AM Industry Experience* is the number of years that the manager has been working in the asset management industry. 1_{MBA} indicator equals one if the manager has an MBA degree. 1_{MA} indicator equals one if the manager has a non-MBA Master's degree. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund's inception. *Number of Funds* is the number of funds in the manager's portfolio. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. 1_{Equity} indicator equals one if the fraction of equities in manager portfolio is above 50%. 1_{Owner} indicator equals one if the manager owns the firm. $1_{Extra\ Role}$ indicator equals one if the manager has an extra role in the company (such as CEO or head of the investment committee). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

<i>y=Split Ratio</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$1_{Skilled}$	0.12** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)
<i>Fund Age</i>	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.07)	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.15*** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)
<i>Number of Funds</i>	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
<i>Manager Age</i>	0.12 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)
<i>Fund Experience</i>	0.16** (0.07)	0.21** (0.10)	0.21* (0.11)	0.25*** (0.08)	0.22** (0.11)	0.23* (0.12)
<i>MF Industry Experience</i>	0.12 (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	0.12 (0.13)	0.13 (0.11)	0.12 (0.10)	0.12 (0.11)
<i>AM Industry Experience</i>	0.21** (0.10)	0.26** (0.11)	0.26** (0.13)	0.22** (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)	0.24*** (0.09)
$1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.04** (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
1_{MBA}	0.26** (0.12)	0.23* (0.12)	0.20 (0.12)			
1_{MA}	0.14** (0.07)	0.15 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)			
1_{Equity}	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
1_{Owner}	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)			
$1_{Extra\ Role}$	0.13** (0.06)	0.17* (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)			
Observations	1,242	1,222	1,222	1,221	1,132	1,175
R-squared	0.22	0.38	0.45	0.60	0.68	0.89
Firm FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Firm×Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Manager×Firm FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Manager×Team FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Table B6: Production Complementarity Effects on Manager Split Ratio

This table presents the results from regressing manager split ratio on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. *Split Ratio* is the ratio of the manager's compensation to her fee revenues. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large Sales Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y = Split Ratio_t$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$1_{Skilled}$	0.37*** (0.12)	0.42*** (0.15)	2.31** (1.08)	2.22** (0.90)
1_{Team}	-0.78 (0.63)	-0.83 (0.68)	-2.44 (2.03)	-2.70 (2.33)
$1_{Skilled Team}$	-0.42** (0.20)	-0.41** (0.20)	-0.34** (0.15)	-0.44* (0.23)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	-0.49*** (0.19)	-0.48** (0.21)	-2.09*** (0.72)	-3.24** (1.50)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled Team}$	-0.26** (0.13)	-0.25** (0.12)	-0.78** (0.33)	-0.70** (0.35)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High Visibility}$			0.03** (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large Sales Team}$			-0.19** (0.08)	-0.19** (0.08)
$1_{High Visibility} \times 1_{Large Sales Team}$			-0.64** (0.31)	-0.60** (0.30)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High Visibility} \times 1_{Large Sales Team}$			0.38** (0.19)	0.19* (0.10)
Observations	1,108	1,108	938	938
R-squared	0.67	0.69	0.72	0.73
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table B7: Production Complementarity Effects on Manager Productivity and Compensation: Using Alpha as a Measure of Skill

This table presents the results from regressing manager compensation on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. $Compensation_t$ is the manager's compensation in shekels. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled}^{alpha}$ indicator equals one if the average alpha of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's alpha is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y =$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$Log(Revenue_{t+1})$	$Log(Compensation_t)$	$Log(Revenue_{t+1})$	$Log(Compensation_t)$
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha}$	0.12** (0.05)	0.17** (0.08)	0.11** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.06)
1_{Team}	0.15** (0.07)	0.02 (0.11)	0.12** (0.06)	0.11 (0.12)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} Team$	0.29* (0.15)	-0.13** (0.05)	0.31** (0.14)	-0.11** (0.05)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} \times 1_{Team}$	0.07** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.08** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.05)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} \times 1_{Skilled}^{alpha} Team$	0.16** (0.07)	-0.12** (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.08)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} \times 1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.05** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.31** (0.15)	-0.18** (0.09)	0.34** (0.16)	-0.17*** (0.06)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.08 (0.15)	-0.21** (0.09)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.18** (0.08)
$1_{Skilled}^{alpha} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)
Observations	938	938	938	938
R-squared	0.92	0.81	0.93	0.82
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table B8: Production Complementarity Effects on Manager Productivity and Compensation: The Role of Experience

This table presents the results from regressing manager compensation on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. The regression specifications correspond to columns (1) and (2) from Panel B of Table 4 with the addition of a set of interaction variables with $1_{Experienced}$. For brevity, we only report the coefficients on selected interaction variables. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

Selected Interaction Variables	(1)	(2)
$y =$	$\text{Log}(\text{Revenue}_{t+1})$	$\text{Log}(\text{Compensation}_t)$
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	0.08** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}$	0.13** (0.06)	-0.12** (0.05)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.31** (0.14)	-0.18* (0.09)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.05 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.05* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Experienced}$	0.04 (0.11)	0.05 (0.05)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	0.11 (0.13)	0.07** (0.03)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	0.18 (0.22)	0.05 (0.07)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	-0.45 (0.55)	0.32 (0.46)
$1_{Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	-0.21 (0.26)	0.15 (0.32)
$1_{Skilled\ Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.17)
$1_{Large\ Sales\ Team} \times 1_{Experienced}$	0.12 (0.65)	0.01 (0.08)
Observations	938	938
R-squared	0.95	0.82
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	Yes
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	No
Control variables	Yes	Yes

Table B9: Production Complementarity Effects on Compensation and Revenue Growth

This table presents the results from regressing one-year changes in future manager compensation and revenue on current team and firm characteristics, and their interactions with current manager characteristics. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$y=\Delta\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})_{t,t+1}$	$y=\Delta\text{Log}(\text{Compensation})_{t,t+1}$	$y=\Delta\text{Log}(\text{Revenue})_{t,t+1}$	$y=\Delta\text{Log}(\text{Revenue})_{t,t+1}$
$1_{Skilled}$	0.21** (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)	0.31* (0.16)	0.32** (0.16)
1_{Team}	0.03 (0.06)	0.16 (0.18)	0.13** (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)
$1_{Skilled\ Team}$	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)	0.44** (0.21)	0.28* (0.14)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	-0.22 (0.27)	-0.25 (0.23)	0.25 (0.40)	0.22 (0.36)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}$	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility}$	0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	0.22** (0.10)	0.27*** (0.10)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	-0.23 (0.21)	-0.22** (0.11)	0.16** (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$	0.12** (0.05)	0.18** (0.06)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.13* (0.06)
Observations	938	938	938	938
R-squared	0.48	0.50	0.62	0.62
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table B10: Transitions Across Teams Within Firms

This table presents the results from regressing one-year changes in manager compensation and revenue on team characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics for the sample of managers who switched teams within firms. The changes are calculated as the differences in the outcome variables between the last year in the old team and the first year in the new team. *Compensation* is the manager's compensation in shekels. *Revenue* is the manager's fee revenue. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$ indicator equals one if the manager starts working with the team at the new firm after being independent at the old firm. $1_{Skilled Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$ indicator equals one if the manager joins the team with positive average skill at the new firm, after working with the negative-average-skill team at the old firm. All the variables with $1 \rightarrow 0$ superscript are indicator variables for the reverse transitions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$y = \Delta \text{Log}(\text{Compensation})_{t,t+1}$			$y = \Delta \text{Log}(\text{Revenue})_{t,t+1}$		
$1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$	0.02 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)	0.13 (0.18)	0.21** (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.17* (0.10)
$1_{Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$	-0.21 (0.04)	0.09** (0.06)	0.07 (0.04)	0.06** (0.13)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.22)
$1_{Skilled Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$	0.16 (0.13)	0.12 (0.11)	0.04 (0.18)	0.34** (0.16)	0.21** (0.10)	0.31* (0.16)
$1_{Skilled Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$	0.13* (0.07)	0.13* (0.07)	0.19** (0.08)	0.21 (0.14)	0.15 (0.17)	0.30 (0.21)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		0.08 (0.10)	0.04 (0.19)		0.38 (0.26)	0.61* (0.28)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		0.07** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)		0.09 (0.28)	0.09 (0.48)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled Team}^{0 \rightarrow 1}$		0.19 (0.22)	0.22 (0.31)		0.14** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled Team}^{1 \rightarrow 0}$		0.14** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)		0.25 (0.38)	0.44 (0.56)
Observations	263	263	161	252	252	159
R-squared	0.26	0.26	0.38	0.41	0.42	0.56
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table B11: Production Complementarity Effects on Net Flows

This table presents the results from regressing manager net fund flows on team and firm characteristics and their interactions with manager characteristics. *Net Flow* is the net fund flow into the manager i 's portfolio funds over the next year, defined as $\frac{AUM_{i,t+1} - AUM_{i,t}(1+R_{i,t+1})}{AUM_{i,t}}$. 1_{Team} indicator equals one if the manager is working with the team. $1_{Skilled\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the average skill of the manager's teams is positive. $1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$ indicator equals one if the ratio of sales and marketing employees to the total number of funds for the given firm is above the median. $1_{Skilled}$ indicator equals one if the manager's skill is positive. $1_{High\ Visibility}$ indicator equals one if the number of newspaper articles about the manager in the four major business outlets in Israel is above the median. $1_{Experienced}$ indicator equals one if the manager's mutual fund industry experience is above the median. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors double-clustered by manager and year are in parentheses.

$y = Net\ Flow_{t+1}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$1_{Skilled}$	0.45*** (0.10)	0.29** (0.11)	0.34* (0.18)	0.36** (0.14)
1_{Team}	0.09* (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.07 (0.09)	0.13 (0.12)
$1_{Skilled\ Team}$	0.12*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Team}$	0.34** (0.11)	0.25** (0.12)	0.22** (0.09)	0.24** (0.10)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Skilled\ Team}$	0.16** (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.15** (0.07)	0.14** (0.07)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility}$			0.11** (0.05)	0.13* (0.07)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.35* (0.18)	0.38** (0.17)
$1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.20 (0.19)	0.15 (0.25)
$1_{Skilled} \times 1_{High\ Visibility} \times 1_{Large\ Sales\ Team}$			0.28** (0.13)	0.23** (0.11)
Observations	1,108	1,108	938	938
R-squared	0.66	0.68	0.67	0.69
Firm \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Manager FE \times $1_{Experienced}$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes